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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of three empirical studies on the international expansion 
of US fast-food chains.  The first study examines how cross-market externalities—the 
combined effect of economies of scale and learning from previously entered foreign 
markets—influence McDonald’s choice of foreign market entry mode.  The second study 
further exploits McDonald’s international development path in assessing whether the 
factors that influence timing of foreign market entry also influence the pattern of foreign 
market development after entry.  Finally, the third study investigates how knowledge 
accrues and transfers within the foreign market operations of another US fast-food 
franchisor.  Together, these studies contribute both methodologically and empirically to 
better understanding not just how and when firms enter foreign markets but also how they 
develop their presence and capabilities in foreign markets after entry.  Much prior 
research has focused attention on entry itself, taking entry as an ending rather than a 
beginning.  With this dissertation and the work that grows out of it, I seek to draw the 
attention of international business researchers towards how firms develop and manage 
foreign markets after entry.  Of particular interest herein is the influence of experience, 
scale and ownership structures on the development of franchisors’ foreign market 
operations.  Additionally, I seek to show the particularly rich and underexplored 
empirical context of franchised chains as they expand internationally. 
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In the first exploratory study, I seek to understand the influence of cross-market 
externalities on McDonald’s choice of foreign market entry mode.  In contrast to prior 
research that has typically adopted a cross-section of firms to investigate foreign market 
entry choices, I exploit a cross-section of countries that a single firm, McDonald’s, has 
entered.  In so doing, I seek to control for the effect of market-specific factors that 
enhance a market’s attractiveness and result in earlier market entry so as to identify 
market-spanning factors—experience and scale in related markets—that may influence 
which of three modes—contracting, joint venture, and subsidiary—McDonald’s chooses 
to govern operations within a foreign market.    While data limitations constrain this 
study’s findings, this initial exploratory study motivated my interest in what happens not 
only at the moment of entry but rather during the extended period after entry that to date 
has received notably less attention.  Furthermore, I am undeterred in my commitment to 
obtain additional information to more effectively determine the influence of cross-market 
externalities related to scale and experience on entry mode decisions. 
In the second study, I examine the factors that effect not only entry but also the 
subsequent growth of retail chains in foreign markets.  Specifically, I focus on 
McDonald’s expansion around the globe.  Arguably, McDonald’s has introduced 
franchising as well as the American concept of fast-food to many foreign markets.  
Moreover, this firm has by now expanded throughout most of the world.  Thus, it is of 
particular interest to examine the international expansion path that it chose to pursue.  
The pattern of entry into foreign markets and growth that I observe contradicts the notion 
that McDonald’s expanded abroad only after saturating existing markets.  Instead, I find 
evidence that is consistent with traditional profit maximization arguments for a multi-
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market firm as I see McDonald’s allocating resources to achieve growth across many 
desirable markets, particularly favoring those with greater market potential (higher GDP 
per capita and population).  More importantly, I find that some of the factors that affect 
expansion post-entry are different from those that affect entry.  I interpret these results as 
evidence that there are sunk costs associated with entry and that the firm adapts its 
expansion pattern in response to changes in local market circumstances post entry. 
The third study analyzes how firm capabilities develop in foreign markets.  
Learning economies arise when efficiency gains accompany operating experience.  
Strategy research emphasizes the importance of developing and exploiting learning 
economies as a means of achieving competitive advantage.  This study employs a unique 
proprietary dataset of 600,000+ weekly observations covering all outlets (2,000+) of the 
foreign operations of a single global franchised fast-food chain in its 10 largest markets to 
ascertain just how binding ownership boundaries are to knowledge transfer and to 
examine how knowledge accrues from operating experience across different countries.   
Not surprisingly, I find that recent experience affords greater learning economies 
than that gained in the past as knowledge is found to depreciate by four percent per week.  
However, in stark contrast to prior studies, I find that knowledge from experience gained 
at other outlets owned by the same franchisee affords no significant learning economies 
and may introduce diseconomies.  Interestingly, knowledge derived from the operating 
experience of outlets owned by country developers—firms responsible for developing a 
foreign market—appears to matter most.  Not only do franchisee-owned outlets within a 
country experience learning economies from country developer experience but such 
economies appear to exceed even those related to own outlet experience.  Finally, 
 4
learning economies can differ by as much as threefold across the countries examined 
herein and knowledge derived from the chain’s total foreign market operating experience 
seems to afford no learning economies.   
These findings challenge the unqualified view that knowledge transfers more 
readily within firm boundaries than across them.  If contracts can equally or more 
effectively facilitate transfer of knowledge than common ownership, the basic tenet of the 
knowledge-based view of the firm—that knowledge transfers more readily within firm 
boundaries than across them—must be reconsidered. 
This work demonstrates how the internationalization of franchised service chains 
and their use of complex multi-level ownership structures afford a rich empirical context 
in which to examine foreign market development over time.  Also, the three studies 
emphasize the importance of having extensive, detailed panel data to examine empirically 
the relationships of interest, especially where high levels of multicollinearity (e.g. 
experience and time) make identification difficult.  In concert, these studies contribute to 
understanding foreign market development as well as entry and suggest that what 
happens after foreign market entry merits greater research attention. 
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CHAPTER 2  
CROSS-MARKET EXTERNALITIES AND 
FOREIGN MARKET ENTRY MODE 
2.a. Introduction 
Foreign market entry mode is among the most important decisions facing a firm 
expanding abroad.  Entry mode largely defines the structure of incentives, control, and 
rewards through the allocation of ownership between the firm entering the foreign market 
and its local agent(s).  As such, it is a critical factor for success within the foreign market.  
Further increasing the importance of a firm’s entry mode selection is the fact that it 
involves a discrete choice that is typically infrequently altered thereafter.  Not 
surprisingly then, much attention has been attributed to the question of how firms enter 
into new foreign markets.   
Researchers within cost-economizing frameworks—including transaction cost and 
agency theory—have viewed the firm’s entry mode choice as being a response to the 
firm’s environment, the tasks undertaken and the skills of the parties involved.  An 
extensive body of knowledge has emerged from this stream of research to explain how 
the foreign market attributes alter the relative costs of organization among discrete 
alternatives.  Most often adopting a cross-sectional approach, this research has sought to 
control for firm specific factors such as age and experience at a moment in time.  
However, one might well expect firms to adjust their entry mode choices not just as a 
function of market-specific factors but also as a function of market-spanning factors.  If 
prior experience in a related market enables the firm to better understand how to operate 
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within a new market, the firm will be less dependent on the local agent than absent such 
knowledge.  Furthermore, the current scale in proximate countries already entered may 
create the possibility of scope or scale economies that may be easier to realize if the 
activity were fully owned and operated.  This exploratory study seeks to empirically test 
for the influence of such cross-market externalities on the choice of market entry mode. 
Knowledge from prior foreign experience diminishes the firm’s dependence on 
local agents both by enabling the firm to better understand how the business might adapt 
to local market preferences and by enabling it to better oversee the effort of its local 
agents.  On the one hand, such knowledge would enable the firm to stipulate contracts 
that provide higher-powered incentives for local agents and that appropriate greater rents 
for itself.  On the other hand, agency theory suggests that knowledge also reduces the 
cost of monitoring local agents that are employed by the firm.  Also, greater foreign 
presence is accompanied by the need for greater coordination of the activities undertaken 
across multiple markets.  The requirement for coordination makes it more costly for firms 
to relinquish control, suggesting that as a firm’s foreign presence increases it is more 
likely to retain ownership when entering new foreign markets.   
Effectively balancing these competing considerations is especially important for 
firms seeking to develop a global brand.  For these firms, entry mode choice is 
particularly susceptible to cross-market externalities—one market’s operations 
influencing another market’s operations.  As such, I examine the international expansion 
decisions of McDonald’s Corporation, undeniably a leader in global branding, to 
ascertain whether greater international experience and scale increase or decrease its 
likelihood of retaining ownership when entering new foreign markets.  This work is 
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exploratory in that prior cross-sectional research has not effectively distinguished cross-
market externalities from market-specific factors related to entry timing when 
investigating the choice of entry mode.  In future research I will extend this analysis to 
encompass a wider sample of fast-food franchisors.   
This chapter is organized as follows.  In section 2.b., I introduce the empirical 
setting, define “foreign market entry mode” and briefly review alternative criteria in 
choosing foreign market entry modes to develop hypotheses relating cross-market 
externalities to entry mode choice.  In section 2.c., I describe the data.  I present the 
empirical methodology and findings in section 2.d..  In section 2.e., I examine next steps. 
2.b. Empirical Setting, Definitions and Prior Theory  
While the issue of foreign market entry mode is of concern to all firms expanding 
abroad, it is of particular importance to franchised chains.  Where foreign market 
expansion involves monitoring and coordinating outlets widely scattered across a market, 
correctly configuring operations is especially important.  Incorrect governance mode 
choices may well lead to brand erosion, increasing the likelihood of the chain’s 
disintegration.  As such, one would expect franchisors to focus particular attention on 
how they enter foreign markets.1  Given franchised chains’ domestic—and perhaps 
foreign—experience with franchising, however, they should exhibit less reluctance to 
relinquish control via long-term contracts.  This is empirically supported by prior 
research. (Walker, 1989; Kalnins, 2005) noted the prevalence of long-term contracts to 
enter foreign markets. 
                                                 
1 While the McDonald’s data does indicate that franchisors can and do change governance modes as 
markets develop, such changes tend to arise only after several years of operation, indicating that entry 
mode choices tend to remain in place for some time. 
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All franchised chains expanding abroad develop two distinct activities within the 
foreign market.  The first is quite obviously operating the outlets that comprise the 
business concept being transferred from the home market into the foreign context.  The 
second corresponds to the role that the franchisor plays within its home market.  The 
franchisor serves the role of ensuring that brand quality and consistency are maintained 
by coordinating the efforts of the diverse, widely distributed operating outlets.  This study 
considers exclusively the question of entry mode and governance relating to the latter 
role assumed by the franchisor in the domestic market.  I assume that franchisors enter 
foreign markets with a single market-wide governance mode.2   
Due to the heterogeneity in contracting practices across franchised chains 
(Lafontaine & Shaw 1999), I restrict my attention to a single franchised fast-food chain—
McDonalds.  I study the period from the company’s inception in 1955 through 1999.   
This chain has led the international expansion of US franchised chains over the past 35 
years, and by 1999 had entered 118 foreign markets.  As McDonald’s was most often the 
first US fast-food chain to enter each foreign market, the importance of strategic issues 
with respect to Burger King or Wendy’s entry timing are largely diminished and will not 
be addressed here.  If any franchised chain effectively analyzes foreign markets, and 
structures its foreign operations to advantage, McDonalds would seem the most likely 
candidate.  By 1999, McDonald’s generated $19 billion annually in foreign sales, 
exceeding its domestic sales for the first time and exceeding the foreign revenues of any 
other US (or foreign) franchised chain.  Thus, although this analysis is limited to a single 
                                                 
2 For the firm studied here, McDonald’s, this proves a valid assumption since the only instances where it 
entered a country with more than one entry mode involved multiple joint ventures.  As such, I am able to 
view joint venture as the foreign entry mode and there are just several of them employed within that 
market.  Furthermore, Kalnins found additional support for this assumption within other franchised chains 
expanding abroad. (Kalnins, 2005) 
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company and as a result is subject to a lack of generalizability, McDonald’s entry into 
such a large number of different countries provides an interesting case in which to 
examine empirically foreign market entry mode choices over time as a firm expands 
abroad. 
The internationalization of franchised chains has received scarce attention within 
academic circles.  What little published research exists directly addressing international 
franchising principally concerns (1) the extent of franchising as an organizational form 
within different markets (Welch, 1989; Whitehead, 1991; Preble and Hoffman, 1995; 
Swartz, 1995); (2) the motivations and required capabilities of franchisors wishing to 
expand abroad (Aydin and Kacker, 1989; McIntyre and Huszagh, 1992; Fladmoe-
Lindquist, 1996; Shane, 1996; Falbe and Welsh, 1998); and (3) the conditions under 
which one expects to see franchisors own or franchise outlets in a selected foreign outlet 
(Erramilli and Rao, 1990; Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995; Contractor and Kundu, 
1998, 1998).  To my knowledge, only two studies have examined empirically how 
multinational franchised chains govern foreign markets. (Lafontaine and Oxley, 2004; 
Kalnins, 2005)  Thus, this study seeks to shed light on foreign market entry mode choice 
within a new empirical context. 
Researchers use the phrase “foreign market entry mode” to mean different things.  
Some compare entry through greenfield investment—startup of a new enterprise by the 
entering foreign firm—versus acquisitions of preexisting host-country firms.  Others 
concentrate on what organizational form—contracting, alliance, joint venture, 
subsidiary—is adopted to govern the operations within the foreign market.  Still others 
focus exclusively on the proportion of ownership retained by the entering firm when 
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setting up operations in a new foreign market.  For the purposes of this study, entry mode 
assumes one of three forms—long-term contracting, joint venture or subsidiary—as these 
are the three modes observed in the data.  Each of these modes implies a different 
division of equity between McDonald’s and its local partner(s); contracting leaves all 
equity with the local partner, a joint venture involves shared equity, while in a subsidiary 
McDonald’s retains all equity.  These discrete organizational forms thus sit upon a 
continuum reflecting the degree to which McDonald’s retains control through 
ownership.3  Additionally, ownership choices are often viewed as influencing the degree 
to which knowledge transfers across operating units of a firm.  I explore this issue more 
fully within Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
Prior research regarding the choice of foreign market entry mode has emerged 
from two distinct branches of business research:  one cost-economizing and the other risk 
reducing.  The former is populated by economics-trained researchers largely in the 
transaction-cost tradition while the latter is comprised of sociology-trained researchers 
grounded in the behavioral theory of the firm. 
Transaction cost economists (TCE) view governance as, “…a means by which to 
infuse order in a relation where potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities 
to realize mutual gains.”  (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996)  TCE describes the firm as a 
governance structure where: 
1. Human actors are both boundedly rational with foresight and “self-interest seeking with 
guile”.   
                                                 
3 For franchisors developing their own brand equity within foreign markets, it seems reasonable to assume 
that entry will not arise through acquisition of a pre-existing, known business that will become part of the 
McDonald’s franchise.  This assumption is further supported by the fact that only in Italy did McDonald’s 
undertake an acquisition.  Furthermore, in this instance it had been present in the Italian market for some 
time. 
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2. The transaction is the basic unit of analysis and occurs when “a good or service is transferred 
between technologically separable stages” of an economic activity.  Transaction attributes—
frequency with which transactions arise, uncertainty to which transactions are subject, and the 
degree to which transactions are supported by transaction specific assets—explain much with 
regard to how firms organize economic activity. 
3. Alternative modes of governance (market, hybrid, firm) differ in discrete structural ways 
determined jointly by private efforts to craft mechanisms addressing incentive intensity and 
administrative control and by the institutional environment—polity, judiciary, laws of 
property and contract. 
4. Alternative governance modes have distinctive advantages and disadvantages in adapting to 
unanticipated circumstances that arise during the transacting period.  The nature of the 
required adaptation—autonomous or coordinated—among parties involved in a transaction 
influences the relative costs of organizing economic activity under alternative governance 
modes. 
5. Firm boundaries are constrained by implementation problems relating to replication and 
selective intervention within the firm.  
 
Given the aforementioned, TCE asserts that transactions that differ in their 
attributes are aligned with governance structures that differ in their costs, so as to 
effect an economizing result.  Where there are no hazards to transacting in the market, 
TCE takes market exchange as the default governance mode because it requires no 
bureaucracy to govern economic exchange.  However, in many circumstances the 
contracting hazards stemming from both ex-ante and ex-post opportunistic behavior 
by exchange parties can lead to market failure, where the increased risk attendant to 
transacting exceeds potential gains.  When consummation of a transaction requires 
coordinated bilateral adaptation to address unforeseen future contingencies (aka 
uncertainty), safeguards emerge to mitigate opportunistic behavior and credibly 
commit parties to coordinate.  Where hazards such as free riding or leakage of 
proprietary assets are too large, the safeguard takes the form of internalizing the 
transaction within the hierarchy of the firm.  However, hybrid modes of organization 
such as franchising or joint ventures that sit between markets and hierarchies on an 
organizational continuum may enable parties to better balance the requirements for 
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bilateral coordinated adaptation with those for autonomous adaptation.  Through the 
lens of TCE foreign entry mode decisions are made so as to safeguard against a 
diverse set of transacting hazards.  As increasing market uncertainty makes bilateral 
adaptation difficult through the price mechanism, either joint ventures or subsidiaries 
will emerge to safeguard against such hazards.   
An extensive body of theoretical and empirical literature on foreign entry mode 
has grown out of the TCE framework (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Gatignon and 
Anderson, 1988; Teece, 1986).  Asset specificity and institutional environment 
uncertainty have received the greatest attention from these researchers who have 
provided empirical support for many of the aforementioned tenets of TCE.  However, 
TCE has been relatively quiet with regard to the impact of prior experience on the choice 
of foreign market entry mode. (See the work of Witold Henisz as a notable exception.)  
Whether such silence stems from theoretical leanings to examine discrete (and therefore 
unchanging) structural alternatives or merely from a lack of data, TCE researchers have 
tended to undertake cross-sectional analyses.  In so doing, these researchers have jointly 
controlled for experience and entry timing through the use of firm age, years of foreign 
experience or firm size.  This approach has not enabled these researchers to determine 
whether the influence on choice of entry mode stems from market attractiveness indicated 
by entry timing or rather from the experience of having operated within other markets 
prior to entering a new market.  In spite of TCE’s contributions and robustness within 
static and comparative-static contexts few longitudinal studies exist (e.g. Chang & 
Rosenzweig, 2001) and fewer still have sought to understand the influence of market-
spanning factors such as the evolution of firm size, scope, and experience on the selection 
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of foreign market entry mode (Henisz, 2000).  And, those that have do not isolate market-
spanning factors from market attractiveness with respect to the influence of each on entry 
mode chosen.  
Sociologists or business researchers adopting the lens of internationalization 
theory contend that risk aversion combined with limited knowledge of foreign market 
environments lead firms to expand abroad incrementally, increasing progressively their 
commitment to foreign operations (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990; Barkema, Bell, & 
Pennings, 1996).  A basic tenet of this theory draws upon a key assumption espoused by 
the behavioral school of thought: Individuals within large organizations exhibit 
uncertainty avoidance to a great degree, emphasizing short-run reaction in response to 
short-run feedback rather than anticipating long-run, uncertain events.  (Cyert & March 
1963)   According to internationalization theory, manufacturing firms initially export into 
foreign markets, then establish offshore sales subsidiaries and finally transplant 
production facilities.  In the current setting, franchised chains can neither export nor 
merely establish sales subsidiaries.  Consequently, in this context, the corollary would be 
a progression from long-term contracting to joint ventures and then finally to fully-owned 
subsidiaries.  Thus, this school of thought adopts a more dynamic approach to studying 
foreign market entry than TCE, predicting that as firms gain foreign experience they tend 
to increase their ownership stake when entering new markets.  Unfortunately, the 
underlying mechanisms that explain the preeminent role of risk and downplay the role of 
potential returns are unclear within this theory.  Consequently, while internationalization 
theory has received some empirical support (Luostarinen, 1980; Newbould, Buckley and 
Thurwell, 1978), it remains unclear what such analyses are actually testing.   
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In this study, I examine the effect of cross-market externalities, including the 
value of prior experience in other foreign markets and the current scale of operations in 
other markets, on franchised chains’ foreign market entry mode.  In so doing, I seek to 
understand whether McDonalds’ choices are consistent with cost-economizing motives, 
risk-aversion motives or both.  For risk aversion motives, the test merely involves 
understanding whether McDonald’s entry mode choice is predominantly lower-equity 
stakes during the early years of expansion with an increasing equity stake as the firm 
enters more markets.  For cost-economizing, the test is more difficult.  These motives 
would dictate that the equity stake at time of entry increases as uncertainty and expected 
market scale increase.  The former makes it hard to contract efficiently whereas the latter 
justifies a greater equity stake.  But experience in other markets may reduce the 
uncertainty of the market being entered, making it easier to contract efficiently.  Also, 
scale in other markets may drive the firm to assume a greater equity stake so as to 
coordinate activity across markets more effectively.  As I am unable to disentangle 
measures of cross-market scale from those of cross-market experience, I am left without a 
clear prediction but rather with the ability to determine the net effect of these two 
underlying mechanisms.4 
                                                 
4  Given the limitations of the data, I am only able to examine the NET effect of the cross-market 
externalities but am currently exploring how in future work I may disentangle the influence of experience 
from that of scale in other foreign markets. 
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2.c. Data 
From McDonald’s 1955 to 1999 annual reports, I identified the timing of entry 
into each country, entry mode employed, and year-by-year outlet counts from that point 
forward.  EntryMode then is defined as the governance mode employed by McDonald’s 
when entering a foreign market.  This variable takes one of three possible values: 
EntryMode=1 for a long-term contract where the local agent retains complete ownership 
EntryMode=2 for a joint venture where McDonald’s shares ownership with the local agent  
EntryMode=3 for a subsidiary where McDonald’s retains complete ownership  
I use the annual outlet count data for each market to calculate alternative measures of 
foreign market experience and scale, based upon three aspects: years in market, number 
of markets, and number of outlets.   
Ideally the measure(s) selected for this analysis should respectively capture the 
degree to which McDonald’s learning from prior experience diminishes uncertainty in 
subsequent similar markets, and the extent of economies from coordination across 
markets or increased interdependencies due to such spillovers as arise from customers 
that visit outlets across multiple markets.  I proxy for actual cross-market externalities 
with measures of the opportunity for cross-market externalities.  Time in foreign markets 
and scope of foreign presence are the two dimensions that most likely increase the 
opportunity for cross-market externalities.  The longer McDonald’s has been operating in 
a specific geographic territory, the more exposure it has gained to changing 
environmental conditions in similar contexts.  As such, it will likely have learned to 
interpret and respond to such changes more effectively.  Also, with greater scope of 
market experience, McDonald’s gains a more diverse set of contexts from which to draw 
upon.  As McDonald’s expands it presence outside its home market there also exists 
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greater opportunity to leverage economies of scale such as consolidating purchases for all 
markets within a region or developing advertising campaigns that span multiple markets 
(e.g. all Spanish language markets).   
I explore five distinct measures of the “opportunity for cross-market 
externalities”.  They are: Markets, Outlets, Years, Market-Years, Outlet-Years.  Markets 
is a count of the number of markets that McDonald’s has entered within a geographic 
territory.  Outlets is similarly the number of outlets operated in a geographic territory.  
Years is the number of years McDonald’s has been present in a geographic territory.  
Outlet-Years cumulates the number of years of operation across all outlets in a 
geographic territory.  Finally, Market-Years cumulates the number of years of operation 
across all markets in a geographic territory.  For instance, if in year one McDonald’s 
opened its first foreign outlet within Canada and in year two McDonald’s opened two 
more outlets in Canada and entered Germany as well with one outlet then as it 
contemplated entry into an additional market in year 3 it would have 4 outlet-years 
experience and 3 market-years experience.  These alternative measures capture different 
aspects of possible cross-market externalities, placing different emphasis on current scale 
and prior experience, depending on the measure considered.   
I specify “geographic territory” along two dimensions: Foreign, and Regional.5  
Foreign involves all markets and outlets outside of the United States.  Regional assigns 
markets and the outlets in them to six CIA-defined regions: Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe, South America, North America/Caribbean, Oceania/Asia, and Africa/Mideast.  
                                                 
5 Two alternative measures relating to McDonald’s own internal administrative country groupings and 
country groupings based on Hofstede’s cultural distance measures (Hofstede, 1983) as well as groupings 
based on common language spoken were also examined.  The use of these different regional groupings 
added little to the model and was accordingly dropped. 
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Experience operating within several European countries would likely make it easier (i.e. 
less costly) to enter additional European countries but would afford relatively less help in 
entering a country in Asia.  This illustrates how regional experience may well be more 
relevant than all foreign experience combined and explains the use of regional measures 
as well as foreign measures.  Table 1 below reflects the different measures that emerge 
when coupling the earlier measures of cross-market externalities with the two geographic 
dimensions identified here. 
Table 1: Alternative Measures of Cross-Market Externalities 
 Markets Outlets Years Market-Years Outlet-Years 
Foreign ForeignMarkets ForeignOutlets ForeignYears ForeignMarketYears ForeignOutletYears
CIA Region RegionMarkets RegionOutlets RegionYears RegionMarketYears RegionOutletYears
Foreign measures of cross-market externalities exhibit extreme multicolinearity 
with correlations in excess of 0.95, while regional measures exhibit only slightly lower 
multicolinearity with correlations ranging from 0.82 to 0.98.  Combined with the limited 
number of observations in my data, this multicollinearity has two implications: (1) only 
one foreign and one regional measure may be used within each regression and (2) little 
empirical difference exists among the different measures.  Following the earlier logic, the 
opportunities for cross-market externalities seem to increase with both the number of 
years (prior experience) and the number of markets (current scale).  Consequently, I 
adopt foreign market-years and regional market-years as my measures of cross-market 
externalities. 
I introduce several country-specific variables relating to market potential, market 
uncertainty, and market connectedness internationally.  Market potential captures the 
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potential magnitude of operations within a country.  As the magnitude increases, the 
setup costs of establishing an equity stake and actively coordinating the foreign market 
operations will likely be offset by the potential rents in the market.  Consequently, one 
should observe greater equity stakes where market potential is higher, all else equal.   
As uncertainty increases in a market, TCE says that it becomes more difficult to 
write contracts and more important to gain the benefit of local agent skills and knowledge 
that can help manage such uncertainty.  Joint ventures would seem an efficient 
organizational form where uncertainty impedes contracting but where there still exists the 
need to induce local agent effort.  Joint ventures have the benefit of enabling partners to 
be motivated to contribute effort required for success when ex-ante it is difficult to 
stipulate future contingencies for an uncertain future.   
Finally, to the extent that the country is well connected to the world economy in 
general, and the US in particular, firms will benefit from additional information available 
with respect to the foreign market.  Foreign trade reflects the degree to which knowledge 
flows to foreign firms regarding the specific business operating practices and general 
environmental context of a market.  Where greater knowledge regarding a market 
diffuses from prior foreign entrants, it will be easier to specify contractual agreements, 
increasing the likely use of less hierarchical modes of entry.  In short, information 
spillovers serve to mitigate market uncertainty and improve the ability of foreign firms to 
manage operations in new country through lower-equity governance modes (e.g. 
contracting).  Similarly, if a market is further geographically from a firm’s home market, 
it is both more difficult to coordinate, more risky, and there is likely reduced knowledge 
spillovers across firms.    
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 Governmental policies can explicitly or implicitly constrain the feasible set of 
governance modes available to a foreign firm entering the market.  For instance, a 
government can ban foreign direct investment or make it administratively so costly as to 
preclude foreign firms from establishing subsidiaries or even assuming an ownership 
stake in the foreign market.  Complicating data collection, country regulations varied 
greatly over my study’s time period.  I employ an index of the degree of capital account 
openness developed by Brune to capture the ease with which firms can repatriate gains 
back to their home market. 
McDonald’s endogenously selects which markets to enter when.  The selection of 
when to enter is likely to confound understanding the relationship between experience 
and entry mode choice.  More attractive markets will most likely be entered earlier and 
therefore McDonald’s will have less experience when entering these.  Furthermore, the 
very characteristics of a country that makes it attractive to enter may make that country 
more likely to be governed by one or another entry mode.  A correlation between entry 
time and mode reflects not exclusively the influence of experience and scale in other 
related markets but likely also the relative attractiveness of the market.  As such, market 
entry timing must be controlled for if I am to understand the independent impact of 
experience in previously entered markets on foreign market entry mode choice.   
To control for market entry timing, I estimate empirically the relative 
attractiveness (a variable I call MarketAttract) of each country into which McDonald’s 
enters based exclusively on country-specific characteristics.  I use two different 
approaches.  First, I derive an OLS estimate of the predicted year of entry.  As OLS 
suffers both from potential violations of normality of the error terms and from censoring 
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of markets not entered, I then re-estimate MarketAttract using a duration model.  
Duration models have the advantage of employing the additional information embedded 
in the fact that certain markets weren’t entered but could have been.  They also control 
for right censoring where McDonald’s has not as yet entered a market but may in the 
future.  In addition, duration models also allow greater flexibility when confronted with 
errors that aren’t normally distributed.  These advantages explain the popularity of 
duration models in examining timing of foreign market entry.  (Henisz & Delios, 2001; 
Delios & Henisz, 2001; Henisz & Macher, 2003; Henisz & Delios, 2002) 
To estimate market attractiveness, I employ five country characteristics:  
GDP/Cap, Population, PoliticRisk, ForeignOpenness, ForeignTrade/GDP, and 
HeadquartersDistance.  In Table 2 below I report the regression results along with 
descriptive statistics for MarketAttract measures generated by OLS and a duration model 
assuming a gompertz distribution. 
In the linear model, GDP/Cap and Population, are negatively signed, reflecting 
that greater market potential results in markets being entered earlier.  As the distance 
between a country and McDonald’s headquarters (in Chicago) increases, entry is delayed.   
The duration model provides consistent findings for market potential and country 
distance.6  In addition, the duration model finds that greater political uncertainty 
(PoliticRisk), greater ability to repatriate profits (ForeignOpenness), and greater foreign 
trade as a portion of a country’s GDP (ForeignTrade/GDP) increase the likelihood of 
entry into a market.  These findings are all consistent with prior research.  The greater 
                                                 
6 The duration model estimates probability of entry while the linear model estimates date of entry.  As such, 
a negative sign in the linear model means a country is expected to be entered earlier whereas a positive 
sign in the duration model means a country has a higher probability of being entered.  This explains the 
differing signs between the two models. 
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information exploited in the duration model causes all variables to become significant in 
influencing entry timing—my measure of market attractiveness. 
Table 2: Results of Alternative Models to Estimate Market Attractiveness 




GDP/Cap -5.818 1.487 
 [1.239]** [0.211]** 
Population -1.827 0.703 
 [0.708]* [0.107]** 
PoliticRisk 2.473 2.259 
 [4.767] [0.691]** 
ForeignOpenness -0.445 0.154 
 [0.351] [0.060]* 
ForeignTrade/GDP 0.001 0.012 
 [0.023] [0.004]** 
HeadquartersDistance 7.3 -1.09 
 [1.921]** [0.287]** 
Observations 83 2,258 
Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
   
 
      Correlations 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 
(1) Actual entry year  92 1987.28 9.31 1967 1999 1.00   
(2) MarketAttract 
      Linear 83 1987.28 5.51 1965 2002 0.30 1.00  
(3) MarketAttract        
      Duration Gompertz 58 -5.34 1.10 -7.73 -2.73 -0.16 -0.65 1.00 
By first estimating MarketAttract and then incorporating the estimates into the 
entry mode models discussed later, I assume that McDonald’s first determines which 
markets to enter and then defines the entry mode to adopt rather than simultaneously 
making both decisions.  In future work I will explore this assumption in greater detail by 
employing a competing risks model to estimate likelihood of entry into a market by 
alternatively a contract, joint venture or subsidiary.  A summary of the independent 
variables employed in the empirical analysis that follows is provided in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Independent Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Market Potential    
      GDP/Cap Logged real (1995) $International GDP/Capita  World Bank, Global Development 
Network Growth Database, 
William Easterly 
      Population Logged total population US Bureau of the Census 
      PopGrowth Average annual population growth rate over 
prior 10 years 
US Bureau of the Census 
Market Uncertainty   
      EconRisk Economic uncertainty; mean standard error of 
real domestic currency GDP/Cap regressed 
on time over prior 10 years divided by average 
GDP/Cap over same period. 
Penn World Tables 
      PoliticRisk Political uncertainty; index ranging from 0 
(least stable) to 1 (most stable) of the stability 
of policy decisions.   
Henisz (2000) “polconiii” 
measure from Witold Henisz’s 
website. 
      ExchgeRateRisk Exchange rate uncertainty; instability of $US 
exchange rate measured as the standard 
deviation of the preceding 10 years divided by 
the average exchange rate over same period. 
World Bank, Global Development 
Network Growth Database, 
William Easterly 
Cross-Market  Externalities  
      ForeignMarket-Years Log ( # market-years in all foreign markets) McDonald’s Annual Reports 
      RegionMarket-Years Log (# market-years in CIA region) McDonald’s Annual Reports 
Interaction Terms   
     EconRisk X Regional 
          Market-Years 
Multiplicative interaction term  
    PoliticRisk X Foreign 
         Market-Years 
Multiplicative interaction term  
     ExchgeRateRisk X   
        ForeignMarket-years 
Multiplicative interaction term  
Global Connectedness   
      MarketAttract Relative attractiveness of market for entry  Estimated herein. 
     ForeignOpenness Index of capital account openness that may 
constrain foreign investment options 
(Brune, 2004) 
      ForeignTrade/GDP Total foreign trade (exports + imports) as % 
GDP 
World Bank, Global Development 
Network Growth Database, 
William Easterly 
      USTrade Log ($US trade w/market)  Statistical Abstract of the US 
      HeadquartersDistance Distance from McDonald’s headquarters in 
Chicago, IL to capital city of foreign country 
Fitzpatrick and Modlin, 1986, 
Direct Line Distances 
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Before advancing to the econometric models, I examine the raw data regarding 
McDonald’s international expansion and foreign entry mode choices.  Figure 1 provides 
an overview of McDonald’s foreign market entries year-by-year from 1967 (when 
Canada marked its first foreign market entry) through 1999.  The number of foreign 
market entries per year range from none (1968, 1969 and 1980) to thirteen (1996).  Three 
time periods (pre 1980, 1981-1989, 1990 and after), emerge from this chart.  The 27 Pre 
1980 entries involve expansions to generally attractive markets (ie. Germany, Japan, 
Australia) or to those that are geographically proximate (Caribbean & Central American 
markets).  The 23 entries between 1980 and 1989 involve expansion into markets with 
relatively less potential and represent an extension of the expansion effort in the 
preceding period.  The post-1989 period distinguishes itself both by the large number of 
foreign market entries, 50, and the nature of the markets entered.  Many of the market 
entries within this period involve entries into freed or liberalized countries (ie. former 
Eastern European countries, China, South Africa, Kuwait).  This period also witnessed a 
relatively large number of entries within the Middle East.  Together, this chart exhibits a 
pattern of expansion where McDonald’s seems to first enter markets with the greatest 
size and stability and then proceed progressively to smaller, less stable markets.
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Table 4 examines the characteristics of McDonald’s cross-market measures of 
experience/scale, country-specific factors, and the regional breakdown by foreign market 
entry mode selected.  Contracting and joint ventures are difficult to distinguish in terms 
of their timing of usage as indicated by the same mean year of entry for markets 
employing these entry modes.  Except for Western Europe where the choice of entry 
mode is evenly split among contracting, joint venture, and subsidiary, the region entered 
is strongly predictive of the entry mode that McDonald’s selects for a market within that 
region.  In Eastern Europe 17 out of 20 markets were entered using a subsidiary; in South 
America 8 of 10 markets were entered using a joint venture; in North America and the 
Caribbean 10 of 13 markets were entered using contracting; in Oceania & Asia 11 of 18 
markets were entered using joint ventures; in Africa & the Middle East 11 of 14 markets 
were entered using contracting. 
Joint ventures tend to be employed in markets with greater potential as reflected 
by larger real GDP and GDP/Capita; whereas, smaller markets are organized under a 
contractual relationship with local partners.  Greater political policy instability, 
PoliticRisk, and greater economic risk, EconRisk, are correlated with the use of 
subsidiaries while lower economic risk appears to be associated with the use of joint 
ventures.  Without conducting an econometric analysis that accounts for market 
heterogeneity however, it is difficult to know whether this reflects market characteristics 
that differ from region to region or distinct approaches on McDonald’s part to structuring 
ownership in different regions.  This table provides evidence of entry mode differences 
across foreign regions, consistent with the view that regional cross-market externalities 
matter. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Foreign Entry Mode 
    Overall  Contracting Joint Venture Subsidiary 
Mean Year of Entry 1987 1986 1986  1989 
Total Company Experience (years) 31.19 30.18 30.17  33.23 
BREAKDOWN OF ENTRY MODE BY REGION 
Western Europe (’71 – ’93) 16 5 5  6 
Eastern Europe (’77 – ’99) 20 0 3  17 
South America (’79 – ’97) 10 1 8  1 
North America (’67 – ’96) 13 10 1  2 
Oceania & Asia (’71 – ’98) 18 5 11  2 
Africa & Middle East (’86 – ’98) 14 11 1  2 
Total 91 32 29  30 
MEAN LEVEL OF FOREIGN EXPERIENCE AND SCALE AT TIME OF ENTRY 
Foreign Markets 42.84 40.38 40.03  48.17 
Foreign Outlets 4,315 4,067 3,929  4,954 
Foreign Years  20.19 19.19 19.17  22.23 
Foreign Market-Years 453 439 403  516 
Foreign Outlet-Years 26,261 25,837 22,697  30,158 
MEAN LEVEL OF REGIONAL EXPERIENCE AND SCALE AT TIME OF ENTRY 
Regional Markets 6.3 6.69 6.45  8.10 
Regional Outlets 331 575 644  304 
Regional Years 12.25 11.03 11.97  13.83 
Regional Market-Years 46.53 56.16 53.10  54.03 
Regional Outlet-Years  1,672 3,455 3,142  1,355 
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC FACTORS 
GDP/Capita $7,893 $9,355 $7,151  $7,051 
Econ Risk   0.029 0.028 0.017  0.039 
Politic Risk 0.296 0.231 0.297  0.360 
Table 5 examines the entry mode choice, country characteristics and regional 
entry decisions by each of the three time periods (pre 1980, 1981-1989, 1990 and after) 
discussed above.  The use of subsidiaries is associated with later entries (and necessarily 
more foreign experience) than either contracting or joint ventures.  This would seem 
consistent with the internationalization view that firms assume entry modes with higher 
equity stakes only after having gained a substantial amount of experience in international 
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expansion.  McDonald’s enters markets that are more attractive based on GDP/Cap and 
the level of Economic and Political Risk earlier than those that are less attractive.  This 
conforms to earlier findings from the regression to derive the measure MarketAttract.  As 
noted above, different regions seem to assume greater or lesser importance in 
McDonald’s international expansion within the three designated time periods. 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics by Decade of Entry 
 Before 1980 1980 – 1989 1990 – 1999 
ENTRY MODE BREAKDOWN  
Total # entries 24 17 50 
 - Contract 11 2 19 
 - JV 7 11 11 
 - Subsidiary 6 4 20 
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC FACTORS 
GDP/Capita $11,714 $8,770 $5,761 
Econ Risk   0.019 0.020 0.036 
Politic Risk 0.309 0.319 0.282 
ENTRY TIMING BY REGION 
North America 37.5% 5.8% 6.0% 
South America 4.2% 11.8% 14.0% 
Eastern Europe 4.2% 11.8% 34.0% 
Western Europe 33.3% 29.4% 6.0% 
Asia & Oceania 20.8% 35.3% 14.0% 
Africa & Middle East 0.0% 5.9% 26.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2.d. Methodology & Findings 
This study asks whether cross-market externalities influence McDonald’s in its 
choice of foreign market entry mode?  If so, what is the net effect of such externalities?  
Because the discrete entry mode choices are a proxy for the latent variable ownership—
degree of ownership (and implied control) retained by McDonald’s in a foreign market—
which has an ordinal character, I model entry mode choice as an ordered logit from 
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contracting to joint venture and finally to subsidiary.  The underlying model of the 
decision of degree of ownership retained is: 
 ownershipc = αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc + εc (1) 
where m is a set of variables related to market potential, u is a set of variables related to 
market uncertainty, k is a set of variables related to cross-market externalities, and z is a 
set of control variables.  The symbols, α, β, γ, and ψ signify the coefficient vectors on m, 
u, e, and z respectively.  The subscript c denotes the country at time of entry.  εc is a 
random error term.  As ownership was unobservable for this study, I instead consider that 
ownership maps onto the observed variable, EntryMode defined earlier. The rule used to 
relate the latent variable, ownership, to the observed variable, EntryMode, is as follows: 
 1 ⇒ Contracting  if         -∞ < ownership < τ1 
EntryMode= 2 ⇒ Joint Venture if  τ1 <=ownership < τ2 
 3 ⇒ Subsidiary  if  τ2 <=ownership <+∞ 
The τ1 and τ2 represent cutoff values for the latent variable (ownership) that determine 
which observed variable (EntryMode) will be selected.  I estimate the likelihood that 
McDonald’s enters a given market with of each the three entry modes as follows: 
Pr(EntryModec=Contracting | mc, uc, kc, zc)  =  Pr(-∞ < ownershipc < τ1 | mc, uc, kc, zc)  
 =  Pr(-∞ < αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc + εc < τ1| mc, uc, kc, zc) 
 =  Pr(-∞ - [αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc] < εc < τ1 – [αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc] + εc | mc, uc, xc, zc) 
 =  Pr(εc < τ1 – [αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc]  | mc, uc, kc, zc) – Pr(εc < -∞ | mc, uc, xc, zc)  
 =  Pr(εc < τ1 – [αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc]  | mc, uc, kc, zc) – 0 
 =  Pr(εc < τ1 – [αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc]  | mc, uc, kc, zc) 
 =  F(τ1 – [αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc] ) 
and likewise:  
Pr (EntryModec=Joint Venture | mc, uc, kc, zc)  
 = Pr(τ1 ≤ ownershipc < τ2| mc, uc, kc, zc)  
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 = F(τ2 – [αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc]) – F(τ1 – [αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc]) 
Pr (EntryModec=Subsidiary | mc, uc, kc, zc)     
 = Pr(τ2 ≤ ownershipc < +∞| mc, uc, kc, zc)  
 = 1 – F(τ2 – [αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc]) 
The selection of F(·)  is made based on the assumed distribution of the error term.  As is 
most common, I assume for this analysis that the errors follow a logistic distribution 
where Pr(ε≤αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc)= 1/(1+e‐[αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc]). 
Thus, I seek parameter estimates for α, β, γ, ψ, τ1, and τ2 that make it most likely 
that McDonald’s would have selected the actual entry modes that it has used.  This model 
examines the effect of an independent variable on the likelihood of being above a 
particular cutoff value, in this case τ1 or τ2.  For McDonald’s then, two likelihoods are 
calculated: (1) the likelihood of using joint venture or subsidiary versus contracting and 
(2) the likelihood of using a subsidiary versus contracting or joint venture.  As an 
example, the log likelihood function can be depicted for (1) as follows7: 
  L1=    Π [1/(1+e-(τ1 – xcω))]mode=”contracting” * [1-(1/(1+e-(τ1 – xcω)))]mode=”jv or subsidiary” 
  or   Π [1/(1+e-(τ1 – xcω))]mode=”contracting” * [1/(1+e(τ1 – xcω))]mode=”jv or subsidiary” 
 Log L1 =  ∑ log  [1/(1+e-(τ1 – xcω))] - ∑ log  [1/(1+e(τ1 – xcω))]     
Note that in the preceding equations xcω replaces αmc + βuc + γkc + ψzc for notational 
convenience.  The ω vector under standard ordered logit models is constrained to be 
identical across the two likelihood functions.8 
                                                 
7 Note that I have depicted only the log likelihood function for (1) but the same applies to (2).  
8 I test the proportional-odds assumption with both a Likelihood Ratio test and a Wald test.  The LR test 
compares the equivalence of the log likelihood from the ordered logit model to that obtained from 
pooling two binary models estimated with logit, adjusting for the correlation between binary outcomes 
related to ownership≤τ1 and ownership≤τ2 .   The LR test yielded a chi2(15)=16.81 with 
Prob>chi2=0.3302, indicating that the parallel regression assumption can be rejected at the 0.33 level.  
The Wald test for the ordered logit model, developed by Brant (1990), compares the parallel regression 
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In Table 6 below I provide regression results from alternative ordered logit 
models.9  Model 1 includes merely country-specific factors and excludes cross-market 
externalities altogether.  Models 2 and 3 introduce cross-market externalities and 
respectively OLS and duration estimates of market attractiveness, MarketAttract.  As the 
OLS model yields 83 observations and is also negatively signed, I employ the OLS 
estimates of MarketAttract in Model 4.  In addition, I interact cross-market externalities 
with the different types of market uncertainty.  This is done so as to examine whether 
such externalities alter McDonald’s choice of entry mode when facing market 
uncertainty.
                                                                                                                                                 
assumption by examining the coefficients on each variable individually.  This test identifies the source of 
the violation as largely due to the variables ForeignTrade/GDP, ForeignMarket-Years, Population, 
GDP/Cap.  While I explored the use of a generalized ordered logit, estimates were clearly invalid as they 
assumed impossible values.  Consequently, I retain the ordered logit in spite of its violation here.  One 
aspect of ordered logit models is that they are highly fragile.  As such, I will be exploring the use of the 
multinomial logit in moving this research forward. 
 
9 See Appendix 1 for raw data on the 72 included countries. 
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Table 6: Ordered Logit Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Entry Mode Entry Mode Entry Mode Entry Mode 
ForeignMarket-Years 0.398 0.632 -0.229
  [0.337] [0.479] [0.603] 
RegionMarket-Years -0.319 -0.491 -0.324
  [0.267] [0.314] [0.273] 
MarketAttract -0.037  -0.061
(OLS)  [0.089]  [0.092] 
MarketAttract -2.205 
(Gompertz Duration)   [1.405]  
EconRisk X 
RegionMarket-Years  -0.009
    [0.009] 
ExchgeRateRisk X 
ForeignMarket-Years  0.006
    [0.011] 
PoliticRisk X 
ForeignMarket-Years  1.59
    [1.215] 
GDP/Cap 1.142 0.656 3.325 0.921
 [0.618] [0.798] [2.295] [1.024] 
Population 0.804 0.63 1.875 0.724
 [0.386]* [0.368] [1.108] [0.435] 
PopGrowth -0.654 -0.819 -1.409 -0.819
 [0.312]* [0.345]* [0.528]** [0.419] 
EconRisk -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 0.035
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.042] 
ExchgeRateRisk 0.007 0.004 0.006 -0.036
 [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.066] 
PoliticRisk 0.375 0.575 4.218 -8.442
 [1.545] [1.599] [3.754] [7.143] 
ForeignOpenness -0.053 -0.06 0.196 -0.088
 [0.106] [0.120] [0.253] [0.123] 
ForeignTrade/GDP 0.013 0.013 0.041 0.012
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.022] [0.008] 
USTrade -0.634 -0.451 -0.076 -0.536
 [0.322]* [0.355] [0.492] [0.403] 
HeadquartersDistance -0.077 -2.664 
 [0.611]  [1.734]  
Observations 72 72 52 72
LR Test 34.18 35.87 27.2 38.89
  Standard errors in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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For the interaction terms, calculation of the partial effect from changing variable 
levels is not directly provided within Table 6.  The partial effects vary with the level of 
the interacted variables.  For ForeignMarket-Years, RegionMarket-Years, 
ExchgeRateRisk, EconRisk, and PoliticRisk, I provide below the partial effect of each 
variable on McDonald’s foreign market entry mode choice when setting the interacted 
variable at its mean observed value.10  In Chart 3, I explore the predicted probabilities of 
each mode across the full range of values observed for the market-specific independent 
variables, setting all other variables at their means. 
                                                 
10 See Appendix 2. 
 33




In Table 7, I consider how successful the model is at predicting McDonald’s 
foreign market entry mode choice.  In 44 out of 72 instances the model accurately 
predicted the entry mode adopted.  Pure chance would have yielded accurate predictions 
of each category 33% of the time.  For contracting, the model accurately predicts in 50% 
of the entries (10 out of 20); for joint ventures the model accurately predicts 65% of the 
entries (17 out of 26); for subsidiaries the model accurately predicts 65% of the entries 
(17 out of 26). 
Table 7: Model Success in Predicting McDonald’s Entry Mode 
 
  Predicted Mode of Entry  
  Contract JV Subsidiary Total 
Contract 10 10 0 20 




Subsidiary 1 8 17 26 
 Total 14 35 23 72 
 
Clearly, the findings are inconclusive because of insufficient information 
contained within the 72 data points.  Population and PopGrowth were the only two 
statistically significant coefficients within any of the models estimated.  One possible 
explanation may relate to the methodology of measuring growth as the percent of market 
size.  Smaller markets may exhibit higher levels of growth (in percentage terms) and thus 
this measure may actually be capturing a phenomenon related to current market size 
rather than potential.  Unfortunately, this explanation receives little support when 
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observing that PopGrowth has a -0.21 correlation coefficient with GDP/Cap and a 0.15 
correlation coefficient with GDP/Cap.   
Rather than try to interpret findings from something which is inconclusive, I 
recognize that to advance this research I require additional data.  I intend to gather such 
data so as to obtain conclusive findings relating cross-market externalities to foreign 
market entry mode. 
2.e. Next Steps 
Unfortunately, data limitations resulted in inconclusive findings for this study.  
While discouraging, I remain convinced of the value of pursuing this line of research in 
the future.  To date, no study has exploited firm-specific longitudinal data to control for 
market attractiveness when trying to identify the impact of prior experience on foreign 
market entry mode choice.  Most prior research has instead employed merely a cross-
sectional analysis of firms with a single measure of age at time of entry.  This approach 
confounds these two effects and cannot convincingly distinguish among the two.  This is 
a problem if we are to determine the relative merits of both the TCE and 
internationalization views relating to foreign market entry mode.  I believe that exploiting 
a competing risks model on such a data set would methodologically make a meaningful 
contribution by considering jointly the issue of when and how firms enter foreign 
markets.  To my knowledge, entry studies have either looked at when or how firms enter 
foreign markets, assuming that these two decisions are independent.  However, this 
seems a questionable assumption when one considers that more direct experience may 
provide firms valuable knowledge to exploit during future entries.  Consequently, earlier 
entries may well be accompanied by greater ownership rather than less, as argued by the 
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internationalization view.  An additional dimension to introduce into this analysis would 
be the ease with which entry mode of governance might change over time.  Within the 
limited data set that I have compiled on McDonald’s such changes arise frequently 
enough to warrant further investigation. 
Through conducting this study, I came to appreciate the importance of not 
stopping at foreign market entry but instead to look beyond to what happens within 
foreign markets after entry.  As I further explored research on firm internationalization, it 
became clear that prior work has predominantly examined when and how entry occurs.  
In the two subsequent studies within this dissertation I examine first the pattern of 
expansion within foreign markets after entry and then how firms develop and exploit 




CHAPTER 3  
BEYOND ENTRY: EXPANSION WITHIN FOREIGN MARKETS 
3.a. Introduction 
An extensive body of literature on firm expansion beyond domestic borders in 
international business has focused on entry, specifically the issues of timing and mode of 
entry, where the latter typically takes the form of exporting, licensing, joint venture or 
FDI.11  While this literature has provided useful insights regarding where and how firms 
enter foreign markets, it treats entry as its own end rather than the beginning of a firm’s 
foreign market involvement.  This focus on entry may stem in part from the frequent use 
of manufacturers as the empirical setting for analyzing expansion; a manufacturer can 
enter a foreign market at the outset with a plant large enough to service the needs of the 
market for some time to come.  In this context, entry rightly may be seen as the end as 
well as the beginning of a firm’s foreign market investment.  But as the U.S. becomes an 
increasingly service-based economy, understanding how service firms expand abroad 
becomes important.  And the reality is that service firms typically enter foreign markets 
with one or a few locations and then expand their geographic coverage of the foreign 
market over time in their quest for customers.  In that case, when and how these firms 
develop additional locations in various markets becomes potentially more informative 
when it comes to understanding firms’ international activities than the choice of timing 
and mode of entry for the initial location(s). 
                                                 
11 See e.g. Hymer 1976; Kobrin 1976; Davidson 1983; Anderson & Gatignon 1986; Teece 1986; Dunning 
1988; Gatignon & Anderson 1988; Kogut & Singh 1988; Barkema, Bell & Pennings 1996; Buckley & 
Casson 1998; Mitra & Golder 2002. 
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In this study I use the empirical context of fast-food franchising to gain a richer 
understanding of international expansion by service firms within as well as across foreign 
markets.  I focus on the expansion of the firm—McDonald’s—credited with introducing 
the concept of franchising itself to many of the markets where it operates.  As 
McDonald’s has  expanded throughout much of the world, looking back at its expansion 
pattern is of particular interest; such a perspective enables us to uncover what attracts a 
firm to pursue particular market opportunities earlier than others that it nonetheless 
subsequently does pursue.  I use data on the number of outlets that McDonald’s operated 
each year in each country since its first foray outside the U.S., into Canada, in 1967.  I 
examine how firm-specific characteristics (such as a firm’s international experience) and 
market-specific characteristics (such as population or purchasing power) previously 
identified as important to firm decisions regarding foreign market entry timing relate to 
observed post-entry growth in outlet counts by McDonald’s within foreign markets.  
Moreover, I can explore how governance mode—subsidiary, joint venture, master 
franchising—adopted by the firm to oversee operations within a market influences the 
rate of subsequent outlet development.  Through this study, I seek to assess which factors 
influence the firm’s market entry decision, which factors influence the firm’s post-entry 
expansion decisions, and how closely the two are related.  Consideration of post-entry 
factors seems notably absent from existing international business research and accounting 
for their influence might well lead to an inversion in the relative attractiveness of entering 
one market earlier than another.  As such, an understanding of these expansion factors is 
not only important in its own right but also when the researcher’s interest is exclusively 
the entry decision. 
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The chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section, 3.b., I briefly summarize 
literature on foreign market entry and identify hypotheses to be empirically tested.  
Section 3.c. describes the data and McDonald’s international expansion.  Section 3.d. 
presents my empirical specification and findings.  Section 3.e. concludes. 
3.b. Overview of Literature and Conceptual Framework 
I ground my study theoretically within economics.  Economic theory holds as a 
core precept that firms should pursue positive net present value projects whenever and 
wherever they arise.  Such projects often entail developing and adopting new 
technologies or diversifying existing product portfolios.  However, the “project” may also 
take the form of geographic development and diversification that expand a firm’s 
physical presence across a market.  Toivanen and Waterson (2005) for example show 
how McDonald’s and Burger King pursued geographic expansion within the UK, starting 
from London.  Herein, my focus is on geographic expansion globally across and within 
numerous foreign markets. 
Following the above precept, if firms are risk neutral, face no capital or 
managerial resource constraints and experience no gains from learning, then they should 
expand into and within all foreign markets affording positive net present value 
opportunities.12  However, if firms face resource constraints or there is option value in 
accumulating information about a market opportunity gradually (there are gains from 
learning about a market), then the same economic theory suggests that firms will 
                                                 
12 I make the basic assumption throughout this analysis that firms—particularly McDonald’s—is risk 
neutral in its decisions. 
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maximize profits by allocating resources across markets in a way that sequentially 
exploits better opportunities earlier than worse ones.13 
Under this scenario, foreign markets in which resource constraints are lower 
afford better opportunities for firms.  While the availability and level of human capital is 
clearly important when considering resource constraints within a country, researchers 
have increasingly turned their attention to examining the influence of a country’s 
institutional and political characteristics on efficient resource allocation, and the impact 
of such institutional and political characteristics on foreign market expansion.14  
Institutional and political factors that affect the capacity of the foreign firm to appropriate 
the returns from its activities reduce the firm’s a priori incentives to invest.  Also, a 
number of studies in finance have established a strong causal effect of the quality of a 
country’s legal system on financial development.15 
Likewise under this scenario, foreign markets that are similar, culturally or 
geographically, to previously entered markets may afford firms better opportunities than 
markets that are dissimilar because the firms’ prior experience can make it easier, and 
therefore less costly, to respond to familiar market demand or supply conditions.  Put 
differently, the firm’s assessment of the probability of success in such similar markets 
may well be higher than for dissimilar markets, making similar markets more attractive 
even if along other dimensions (e.g. population or purchasing power) these markets are 
less attractive.  Stulz and Williamson (2003) have suggested that cultural characteristics 
                                                 
13 For example, standard economic theory implies that a monopolist selling a fixed quantity of output will 
maximize profits by allocating units of output across markets to equalize marginal revenue across 
markets.  Similarly, in finance, firms with limited resources invest in the highest NPV projects. 
14 Refer to Wei (2000), Papaioannou (2004). 
15 See notably LaPorta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999. 
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(religion, societal composition, language) may explain financial flows around the world 
even better than legal quality proxies.  Support for the effect of geographic similarity is 
provided within international trade literature where the “gravity” model uses geography 
and information asymmetries to explain quite successfully the extent of trade not only in 
goods but also in asset flows.16  Of course, the fundamental drivers of market potential – 
here again population and purchasing power – continue to influence the expected net 
present value of market opportunities and thus firms’ decisions concerning where to 
expand abroad. 
Internationalization theory has emerged as a prominent theory within international 
business research.  Relying heavily upon the behavioral assumption of uncertainty 
avoidance, this body of theory argues that firms minimize the uncertainty associated with 
going abroad by doing so only incrementally, starting with modes of entry that involve 
little commitment, such as exporting, and only increasing their involvement in those 
markets where they have found success (Johansen & Vahlne, 1977 and 1990).  This view 
of international expansion is not inconsistent with the options value approach, where 
firms also commit resources only gradually (see Dixit, 1989) and thus are able to 
progressively update their evaluation of different opportunities.  However, 
internationalization theory also seems to suggest that firms would expand abroad only 
after exhausting opportunities within their home market, then enter markets most 
“familiar” to them (namely markets similar culturally or in close geographic proximity to 
those already entered), and that firms will exhaust opportunities in each entered market 
                                                 
16 See for example Portes and Rey (forthcoming) on equity, Mody, Razin, and Sadka (2003) on FDI, and 
Buch and DeLong (2004) on bank flows. 
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before proceeding into new markets.17  In short, profit maximization seems to take a back 
seat to risk aversion.  This stands in stark contrast to traditional economic theory which 
generally holds the view that firms can largely diversify away most types of risk, and as 
such the importance of risk itself is effectively eliminated.   
Contrary to a manufacturing firm whose options include exporting, a retail firm 
such as McDonald’s has no choice but to go abroad, where the customers are, if it is to 
sell its product outside its home market.  Additionally, such a firm must expand the 
number of outlets abroad if it is to reach the geographically dispersed customers there.  
This reality makes it possible for us to observe not only the time at which McDonald’s 
enters a given foreign market but also to track the extent and timing of its expansion 
within each foreign market over time.  As such, I can assess whether this firm pursues 
principally markets that are similar to those in which it has already entered or whether it 
pursues those opportunities across the system that afford the highest net present value 
opportunities. 
While McDonald’s cannot export its product, it can choose among different 
modes of operation in each market, some of which involve a higher degree of 
                                                 
17 Eriksson et al. (1993) provides an overview of the empirical research that examines whether 
manufacturing firms increase their involvement in foreign markets gradually over time, moving from low 
commitment methods of selling abroad, such as exports, to high commitment methods involving 
ultimately foreign direct investments. The empirical literature overall does not support this gradual 
involvement hypothesis.  A number of empirical studies, however, support the idea that firms invest first 
in markets that are nearby and whose populations are similar to the home market culturally. Most of 
these studies are based on small samples and are mostly descriptive in nature (e.g., Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Loustarinen, 1980). Three studies involve larger-sample analyses:  Davidson 
(1980) examines pairwise entry frequencies of foreign direct investment for a sample of 934 individual 
new products introduced by fifty-seven U.S. firms in the period 1945-76. He concludes that “firms in the 
initial stage of foreign expansion can be expected to exhibit a strong preference for near and similar 
culture.” (p. 18). Similarly, Nordström and Vahlne (1994) find a positive rank correlation between 
measures of psychic distance from Sweden and mean rank of entry for their sample of Swedish firm 
investments. Benito and Gripsrud (1992) and Pedersen and Shaver (2000), on the other hand, find no 




commitment of resources than others.  In particular, it can open a subsidiary that 
franchises directly, or enter into a joint venture with a local partner, or establish a master 
franchising arrangement whereby the master franchisee owns and operates all the outlets 
in his or her territory or finds franchisees to do the same.  While the level of investment 
that McDonald’s commits to these markets differs across these different governance 
modes, in all cases McDonald’s exerts significant control over the number of outlets and 
the growth in the number of outlets in each market.  Consequently, in what follows, I 
assume that it internalizes the cost of expansion to a large extent – though potentially to 
varying degrees depending on governance within each market - and that it gets to set the 
expansion path within as well as across all markets.18  
While internationalization theory implies that familiarity will be the driving factor 
in determining where McDonald’s will expand abroad, a prediction I address empirically 
below, it is useful to discuss further other factors that might enter into a firm’s decision to 
expand abroad.  The economic literature on firm entry has focused explicitly on the 
importance of sunk costs in determining the number of firms that can operate and thus 
compete at a point in time in a market (e.g. Bresnahan and Reiss, 1987).  While 
Bresnahan and Reiss consider homogeneous firms, this literature also has examined how 
firm heterogeneity affects the likelihood of entry (Berry (1992), Scott Morton (1999)).  
Specifically, the typical model assumes that heterogeneous firms decide simultaneously 
                                                 
18 For example, while McDonald’s may not fully internalize the cost of expansion in a master franchise 
context, such a contract usually stipulates a development schedule that states the number of outlets to be 
opened at different points in time.  In that sense, McDonald’s can still control the expansion path in such 
markets.  Moreover, as tight development schedules impose higher costs on the master franchisee, they 
will not be willing to pay as much for a contract that requires them to expand very rapidly relative to one 
where they can expand more slowly.  As a result, McDonald’s potentially internalizes the cost of rapid 




whether to enter and incur the sunk costs associated with entry.  Firms then compete in a 
single market, and the resulting combination of production levels and prices determine 
their net profits in this new market.  
My setting differs from that of these studies in that rather than examining multiple 
firms deciding whether or not to enter a given market, I consider a single firm deciding 
whether to enter various markets.  I follow this literature, however, in assuming that 
McDonald’s faces sunk entry costs in each market.  These costs include the cost of 
learning about the rules that govern each new market and about the customers in each 
market.  It would also include the cost of advertising the brand and making itself and its 
product known in this new market.19   Of course, such costs may well be lower in 
markets that are culturally similar or physically proximate to the markets that the firm 
already operates in at any given time.  Also, because of the limited managerial resources 
available at the Chicago head office at a point in time, I assume that these costs are 
convex in the distance – geographic or cultural or both – weighted number of countries 
entered into in a given time period.  This convex cost function will make it more 
profitable not to enter all markets at once.20 
Beyond the cost of entering into a new foreign market, I also attach a sunk cost of 
entry to each new outlet that the firm establishes in a given country.21  This assumption 
                                                 
19 It has been suggested that in some markets, McDonald’s has purposely kept supply low to generate 
queues and thus increase customer interest and perception of quality.  The cost of doing this is the lost 
profit that the firm would have obtained if it operated more outlets faster in these markets.  Such a cost 
would also be part of the sunk cost of entry into these markets. 
20 See Pedersen and Shaver (2000) for an argument that the first entry abroad is particularly costly, while 
those that follow are less so.  They derive and find support for the hypothesis that the time to first entry 
will be larger than the time to second entry. They also find that the time to follow-up entry does not differ 
from the time to second entry significantly. 
21 One might also reasonably assume that there is a cost of opening outlets that operates at the level of the 
chain as a whole, across markets, that is a cost function C = ζ(ΣjOutletsjt).  However, empirically, there is 
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represents the strain on local resources when many outlets are opened at once in the 
market.  For example, it is costly to find enough real estate experts and to analyze large 
numbers of sites to identify a large number of good locations for new outlets.  It is also 
time consuming and costly to identify and train the requisite number of franchisees, 
managers, and employees to staff numerous outlets.  These limits in turn impose a 
constraint on the chain’s growth in any given market in a given time period. 
The combination of the market level and outlet level entry costs will lead to slow 
gradual growth, across markets and within each market, a pattern supported by the data in 
Figures 3 and 4 which show respectively the evolution in the number of U.S. and foreign 
outlets over the history of the firm, and the evolution of the number of outlets in each of 
McDonald’s five main markets. These figures also already suggest that the firm begins 
operating in new markets much before all profitable opportunities to operate in its 
existing set of markets are exhausted, as illustrated by the fact that much growth occurs in 
markets already entered even after entry into new markets 22 
                                                                                                                                                 
large variation in the number of outlets opened in total by the chain each year, so there does not appear to 
be an obvious cross-market constraint or cost operating at this level.  Moreover, discussions with industry 
representatives suggest that markets are developed relatively separately - for example, master franchise 
development schedules are set up independently from those arranged for other markets. 
22 Linn (2004) for example reports that Starbucks plans to triple its store count from the current 8000 to 
25,000 worldwide long long-term.  At this time, it is expanding at a rate of about 3.5 new stores per day, 
which requires that the firm, whose employees already number around 80,000, hire 250 new employees a 
day.  At this rate, it will take Starbucks more than a decade to achieve its current long-term goal. 
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Figure 4: McDonald’s Expansion – Five Largest Markets 
 
While McDonald’s faces costs of expansion into new and within existing markets, 
it is able to assess the long-term prospects of different markets and it is on this basis that, 
according to economic theory, it would decide when to enter a new market.  Specifically, 
assuming that service firms follow manufacturing trade patterns, the international trade 
literature suggests that McDonald’s will initially open outlets in higher-income countries 
and move into lower-income countries later on (Vernon 1966 and Grossman & Helpman 
1991).  Also, just like I see in manufacturing, the firm’s evaluation of each market will 
determine its mode of entry into these markets. 
Suppose then that the demand for McDonald’s product in any given market j at 
time t is given by: 
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where the Zjt are a series of market characteristics such as population and income, the ujt 
is random noise that makes it impossible to precisely predict demand, and pjt is the price 
charged for the product in market (country) j at time t.23  Given price, and holding the 
size of each McDonald’s constant, this demand implicitly defines the optimal number of 
outlets that McDonald’s would find optimal to have in this market at time t.  I use Njt* to 
represent this optimal number of restaurants.  Note that I allow this optimal number of 
restaurants to vary over time as the market evolves over time as well. 
The expected profit from operations in a specific new market at time t if all Njt* 
outlets were opened at once would be 
Πjt = Njt* (πj – F(Njt*)) 
where πj is the present value of each outlet’s profit over the life of the restaurant and 
F(Njt*) is the sunk cost of establishing all these restaurants at once.  Of course, if all 
outlets are not opened at once, the total cost F would be lower.  However, profits 
generated in the market also will be lower as some outlets would then only generate 
profits further in the future.  Comparing the marginal benefit of one more restaurant to 
the marginal cost of establishing one more, McDonald’s will determine the optimal 
number of outlets to be opened in this market each period.  The net present value of the 
profits generated by this expanding set of outlets over time minus the marginal cost of 
entering this specific market at time t would represent the net value of entering this 
market at time t.  Economic theory suggests that at each period t, the firm would rank 
markets not yet entered based on its expectation of net present value overall for each 
market, and enter all those for which the net present value of expected profits are above 
                                                 
23 Note that the demand for franchises in each market is derived from the demand for the firm’s product.  In 
that sense, even if the firm mostly sells franchises, it cares about the demand for its products. 
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the incremental cost of entry.  Of course, at any given time, the expected profits from 
projected outlets in a particular market need not be positive.  In those cases, the firm will 
delay entry until market conditions improve sufficiently so that the profit potential 
outweighs entry costs.  Thus, entry into very low demand markets may be delayed 
significantly. 
Assuming similar sunk costs of opening outlets within the different markets, 
everything else constant, McDonald’s net expected profits from entry will be higher the 
larger the expected number of stores to be opened in a market and the lower the sunk cost 
of entry into a given market.  Thus, in any given period, McDonald’s will first enter those 
remaining markets with the highest expected demand, namely markets where income 
(assuming, of course, that fast-food is a normal good) and population for example are 
high, and markets that are more similar culturally if this means that local customers are 
most likely to appreciate the firm’s product. 
Going beyond entry, however, what does economic theory imply when it comes 
to how McDonald’s should allocate resources to grow within markets?  One way to think 
about the process of expansion within a market is as a series of entry decisions within 
specific submarkets (Toivanen and Waterson, 2005).  The convex cost function for new 
units then constrains the number of outlets to open in each market in any given period.  
Here again outlets or submarkets can be ranked in decreasing order of expected sales, and 
all those for which expected profits are above the incremental sunk cost associated with 
opening a new outlet will be worth opening at time t.  This implies that McDonald’s 
would open those outlets in the most profitable submarkets first.  It also implies that 
McDonald’s will open more outlets faster in high demand countries. 
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In many of the countries where McDonald’s now operates, it brought along not 
just one but two new concepts:  its product – the hamburger, or fast-food itself – and 
franchising.  As a pioneer, it faced significant uncertainty, not knowing how the 
population would react to its product offering.  Hence demand could not be predicted 
with as much precision (the variance of u in (1) is larger) when the firm had no 
experience in the market.24  This implies that there is option value in not developing a 
large number of outlets all at once but rather taking some time to learn about customers, 
tailoring products, and advertising to increase demand in each market.  The cost of 
waiting will be larger, however, in high expected demand markets.  In other words, both 
an assumption of convex sunk cost and the option value approach to this problem imply 
that the number of outlets will grow more rapidly the larger the expected demand in the 
market. 
3.c. The Data 
The panel data set I use is constructed from McDonald’s Corporation annual 
reports which together contain information on the number of stores that the company 
operates in each country in each year since the company’s foundation in 1955.  In 
addition, I gathered information on the characteristics of as many markets/countries as I 
could, irrespective of whether McDonald’s operated outlets in these by the end of the 
study period, in 1999.25  My data are yearly since 1967 as this is when McDonald’s 
opened its first outlet outside of the United States - in Canada.  My goal was to capture 
                                                 
24 See Caplin and Leahy’s (1998) model of search with information externalities. 
25 Appendices 3 and 4 respectively show the list of markets that McDonald’s operates in that are included 
in the data, and the set that I had to exclude for lack of data.  I made every effort to find all the needed 
data for all markets.  Appendix 3 shows that the jurisdictions excluded from the data are typically small, 
and often island, markets. 
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those market characteristics that influence expected demand for McDonald’s in each 
market as well as the level of sunk costs to the extent possible.  Thus, I obtained data on 
GDP per capita, population, the proportion of the population living in urban centers, the 
surface area of the country, the distance of each capital from Chicago, where McDonald’s 
headquarters is located, and so on.  Table 8 shows the details of all these variables, their 
exact definitions and the sources I used.  Table 9 gives descriptive statistics for all these 
variables across all the foreign markets over the period from 1967 to 1999 first for the 
overall sample (irrespective of whether McDonald’s had in fact any outlets within a given 
market at the time), and then focusing on those markets that McDonald’s was in fact 
present in by 1999. 
As one of my goals is to examine whether McDonald’s expands geographically 
only after saturating markets, it is useful to consider this issue using my full data set 
instead of only those few markets that McDonald’s went in early on, as per Figure 4.  
Table 10 shows the number of new markets in which McDonald’s has opened outlets 
during each year after its first foreign market entry in 1967, into Canada.26  The table also 
shows the number of outlets the firm had in the markets it was already in by that time, 
and the number of outlets it added in year t to those markets.  The last three columns in 
the table show the equivalent information but for the markets that McDonald’s enters at 
time t.  Consistent with the conclusions I drew from Figure 4, Table 10 shows that the 
bulk of the growth occurs in the markets that McDonald’s has previously entered despite 
the fact that it is entering many additional markets at any given time.  Thus, the data 
                                                 
26 It also went to Puerto Rico that year.  For the list of countries that McDonald’s operates in by 1999 and 
the year of entry in each case, see Appendix 3. 
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rejects the notion that a firm such as McDonald’s saturates the markets it is already in 
before exploiting opportunities in new markets. 
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Table 8: Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Name Description Units Measure Source(s) 




Outlet Growth Outlet growth from 
preceding year 
None Log(outletst) – Log(outletst-1) Annual 
Reports 
yr_in_mkt Year in market (entry 
year=1) 
Years First year equals 1, 2nd year 
equals 2, … 
Annual 
Reports 
Calendar_yr The calendar year for 
the period t 
Calendar 
Year 
Spans from 1967 through 1999  





Urban_rate Proportion of total 
population residing 
in urban settings 
None # People in urban settings divided 
by total population of the country 
WDI, 
PWT,WB 
Gdpcap Real GDP per capita $US 1995  WDI, 
PWT,WB 
Distance Distance from firm 
headquarters  
Kilometers Great circle distance between 
Chicago and country capital 
 
risk_gdpcap Variability of 
detrended 
GDP/capita as a 
proportion of average 
GDP 
None Mean squared error from 
regression of real local currency 
GDP per capita on calendar year 
from t-6 to t-1 divided by mean 




risk_USxchg Variability of local 
currency and US $ 
exchange rate 
None Standard deviation of exchange 
rate between t-6 to t-1 divided by 
average exchange rate over same 
period.  The result is then divided 





Polcon Index of political 
consistency 
(0, 1) with 
1= most 
consistent 
Henisz (2000) "polconiii" 
measure.  Refer directly to article 




Competitors # of Major US 
Burger Chains in 
Country  
{0,2} Counts whether Burger King and 
Wendy’s present in country.  If 
both there, then =2, one, then =1. 
AR, SEC, 
Press 
East Block Dummy variable for 
Country in East 
Block 
(0,1) Previously part of Soviet 
Controlled countries. 
WDI 
Trade/gdp Openness of country 
to foreign trade 
None Total (exports + imports) divided 
by GDP for a country 
WDI, 
PWT,WB 
foreign_mkts_in Number of foreign 
markets at year end 
Countries  Annual 
Reports 
exper_lang Total Outlets in 
Markets w/Same 
Language 
Outlets Total store count within other 








Table 9: Descriptive Statistics (1967-1999) Excluding US 
 Analysis of Entry Decision Analysis of Post-Entry Expansion 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
outlets 4,481 21.3 121.0 0 3,258 1,071 89.1 235.1 1 3,258 
outlet_growth      1,071 0.29 0.35 -1.61 2.89 
yr_in_mkt 4,481 2.6 5.9 0 33 1,071 10.30 7.75 1 33 
Calendar_yr 4,481 1984 9.56 1967 1999 1,071 1990 7.78 1967 1999 
Population 4,481 31.34 110.95 0.15 1,252.8 1,071 42.71 131.69 0.26 1,253 
Urban_rate 4,479 0.47 0.25 0.02 1.00 1,071 0.69 0.18 0.18 1.00 
Gdpcap 4,345 5,178 8,322 0 45,952 1,071 12,674 11,076 350 45,952 
Distance 4,415 5,889 2,136 437 9,918 1,071 4,850 2,318 437 9,849 
risk_gdpcap 4,222 0.03 0.04 0.0010 0.88 1,071 0.025 0.043 0.001 0.875 
risk_USxchg 4,284 0.049 0.081 0 0.547 1,064 0.0014 0.0095 0 0.2019 
Polcon 4,385 0.18 0.21 0 0.71 1,071 0.36 0.19 0 0.71 
Trade/gdp 4,326 0.69 0.45 0.02 4.39 1,071 0.79 0.58 0.13 4.39 
Competitors 4,481 0.24 0.55 0 2 1,071 0.89 0.76 0 2 
east_block 4,481 0.03 0.18 0 1 1,071 0.071 0.257 0 1 
Foreign_mkts_in 4,481 34.86 24.50 2 87 1,071 51.06 24.65 3 88 
exper_lang 4,481 1,814 3,797 0 16,557 1,071 1,883 4,084 1 16,557 
Arabic Lang 4,481 0.10 0.30 0 1 1,071 0.042 0.201 0 1 
French Lang 4,481 0.23 0.42 0 1 1,071 0.109 0.312 0 1 
German Lang 4,481 0.02 0.15 0 1 1,071 0.071 0.257 0 1 
Portuguese Lang 4,481 0.02 0.15 0 1 1,071 0.020 0.139 0 1 
Russian Lang 4,481 0.03 0.16 0 1 1,071 0.034 0.180 0 1 
Spanish Lang 4,481 0.15 0.35 0 1 1,071 0.254 0.435 0 1 

































1967 0 0 0 2 1 3 
1968 2 3 8 0 0 0 
1969 2 11 24 0 0 0 
1970  2 35 26 1 1 1 
1971 3 62 14 5 5 10 
1972 8 86 54 1 1 3 
1973 9 143 64 2 2 4 
1974 11 211 67 3 3 6 
1975 14 284 70 2 2 4 
1976 16 358 113 2 2 6 
1977 18 477 103 2 2 2 
1978 20 582 130 1 1 1 
1979 21 713 165 2 2 4 
1980 23 882 159 0 0 0 
1981 23 1,041 130 3 1 5 
1982 26 1,176 154 1 0 2 
1983 27 1,332 205 1 1 1 
1984 28 1,538 152 2 2 6 
1985 30 1,696 213 4 2 5 
1986 34 1,914 203 2 2 3 
1987 36 2,120 205 0 0 0 
1988 36 2,325 258 3 2 4 
1989 39 2,587 284 0 0 0 
1990 39 2,871 333 3 3 3 
1991 42 3,207 419 4 2 5 
1992 46 3,631 469 3 2 7 
1993 49 4,107 569 4 1 4 
1994 53 4,680 736 7 5 11 
1995 60 5,427 1,523 6 4 17 
1996 66 6,967 1,866 10 7 38 
1997 76 8,871 1,822 6 5 17 
1998 82 10,710 1,255 4 4 7 
1999 86 11,972 1,547 2 2 2 
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Table 11 shows the number of restaurants added, and the growth rate in number 
of restaurants in percentage terms, as a function of how many years it has been operating 
there.  The figures in the last few rows in the table are based on just a few markets that 
the firm entered very early on, and thus are not reliable.  Ignoring those, this table shows 
a tendency for McDonald’s to open more and more outlets on average in markets it has 
been in for longer periods of time.  Most likely this reflects the fact that it entered the 
most profitable markets fairly early on and is still aggressively developing those markets 
even after 20 or 25 years there.  More importantly, it shows a wide range of outlets added 
or growth rates across countries that McDonald’s has been in for similar amounts of time.  
This fact of course is consistent with the notion that McDonald’s is opening more outlets 
in certain markets than others.  In Tables 8 and 9, I saw a tendency for McDonald’s to 
enter high GDP per capita market relatively early.  In my analyses below, I will see that it 
also opens more outlets in markets with higher per capita GDP, as predicted by a simple 
sunk entry cost model. 
Finally, note that my description has focused on entry and growth in 
underdeveloped markets.  As a result, I relate new outlets and growth in outlets not to 
market growth, but rather to the characteristics of the markets in levels.  In other words, I 
have an entry or diffusion process where the number of outlets at any point in time 
remains far from the equilibrium level.  What I observe are the effects of market 
characteristics rather than the effect of market growth on the growth of outlets.  This is 
standard in entry analyses, and in turn shapes my empirical model below. 
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Table 11: McDonald’s Growth Statistics By Year in Market 




dev. Min. Max. Mean 
Std. 
dev Min. Max. 
Total 
# obs.
1 2.10 2.08 1 17 200% 0% 200% 200% 83 
2 2.80 3.49 0 18 64% 47% 0% 164% 81 
3 3.48 4.90 0 23 45% 33% 0% 120% 77 
4 3.82 4.78 -2 22 34% 42% -200% 125% 73 
5 4.33 5.60 -4 25 27% 26% -67% 86% 64 
6 6.40 8.66 -4 35 28% 24% -40% 90% 58 
7 7.84 11.98 -1 55 22% 20% -13% 82% 51 
8 6.77 13.71 -36 67 17% 20% -42% 74% 48 
9 8.84 11.80 -6 51 17% 29% -150% 54% 45 
10 10.78 15.04 0 57 19% 15% 0% 52% 41 
11 7.92 10.69 -11 41 13% 22% -81% 70% 38 
12 12.71 21.60 -20 114 19% 23% -16% 127% 38 
13 12.47 14.91 -1 52 9% 38% -200% 40% 36 
14 12.61 16.54 0 70 13% 11% 0% 35% 36 
15 14.59 17.71 -1 77 16% 17% -40% 67% 34 
16 12.30 12.44 0 41 18% 15% 0% 67% 30 
17 15.21 19.95 0 94 16% 12% 0% 48% 28 
18 17.41 21.73 0 94 14% 10% 0% 32% 27 
19 19.50 29.03 0 143 15% 13% 0% 59% 26 
20 10.22 29.24 -93 72 10% 12% -21% 31% 23 
21 20.78 25.59 -4 89 14% 11% -6% 40% 23 
22 21.43 25.34 0 91 24% 42% 0% 200% 21 
23 24.20 28.31 0 88 19% 25% 0% 120% 20 
24 27.83 35.49 0 96 22% 45% 0% 200% 18 
25 50.19 88.05 0 349 16% 14% 0% 57% 16 
26 73.50 140.38 -8 522 2% 47% -160% 33% 14 
27 67.18 125.90 2 433 20% 27% 3% 100% 11 
28 73.89 131.61 1 415 10% 6% 4% 21% 9 
29 90.13 141.82 2 406 13% 8% 3% 24% 8 
30 36.67 47.26 0 90 11% 12% 0% 24% 3 
31 36.00 31.11 14 58 10% 6% 6% 14% 2 
32 20.00 21.21 5 35 4% 1% 3% 4% 2 
33 23.50 23.33 7 40 5% 2% 4% 6% 2 
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3.d. Empirical Model and Results 
Economic theory suggests that a firm like McDonald’s forecasts its optimal 
number of outlets in each market based on market characteristics, and in any given period 
compares the profitability of entering any given market to the incremental cost of 
entering that market.27  In other words, I have a notion of optimal number of outlets in 
each market given its characteristics, Njt*, such that: 
      Njt* = f(Zjt ) + εjt   
where the Zjts for example include market population and per capita income, as well as 
measures of country risk. I expect the latter to have a negative effect on the optimal 
number of outlets but market population and per capita income should have a positive 
effect on the same.  Note that I allow the optimal number of outlets to vary over time as 
the market itself evolves. 
A firm’s expansion across markets is a dynamic one that evolves over time.  
Because the firm is initially absent from all markets, and given the assumptions of 
convex sunk costs and option value discussed above, yearly observations of outlet counts 
will not represent long-term equilibrium configurations of outlets across markets until 
many years after entry for all but the tiniest of markets.  The intense growth of 
McDonald’s in markets it has been in already for 20 or 25 years, depicted in Table 11, 
suggests just how slow the diffusion process is.  Thus, the firm is typically playing catch-
up, growing not in response to growth in the market, but in response to the overall 
expected desirability of the market based on the firm’s experience in foreign markets. 
                                                 
27 Indeed, in their study of international expansion, Gonzalez-Diaz and Lopez (2002) use franchisors’ stated 
desired market size per outlet to determine the point of market saturation.  
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Like most studies of international expansion processes, I begin with an analysis of 
entry decisions.  Specifically, I use duration analysis to model entry by McDonald’s into 
a foreign market.  In this analysis, a market j is considered to be at risk of entry if that 
market is an independent jurisdiction and in year t McDonald’s has not as yet entered into 
it.  Assuming a proportional hazard and an exponential survival function, I have 
h(t|xjt)= h0(t)exp(xjtβ)  
while under a Weibull distribution, I have  
h(t|xjt)= p * exp(xjtβ)tp-1 .28 
Results from estimating the hazard of entry as a function of my explanatory 
variables which include market characteristics related to demand (the Zjt above) but also 
firm and market characteristics that may affect the cost of entry, using both the 
exponential and Weibull proportional hazard models, are summarized in Table 12.  They 
show that indeed high market potential, captured by both GDP per capita and population 
is an important factor attracting McDonald’s to particular foreign markets.  Moreover, I 
find that trade/GDP also has a positive effect on the likelihood of entry, which would 
occur if high trade levels implied similar cultures or economic development, but also if 
such high trade levels lowered the cost of entry into a market for institutional reasons.  
Interestingly, high tax rates relates positively with the likelihood of entry.  Most likely 
this relationship is explained by the fact that high tax rates are more likely in more 
developed economies, which in turn are more likely to attract entry.  None of my risk 
measures (based on variance in GDP, or exchange rate fluctuation, or Henisz’ political 
consistency measure) have statistically significant effects on the likelihood of entry. This 
                                                 




is consistent with McDonald’s behaving like a risk neutral agent.  Similarly, the presence 
of competitors does not significantly affect the likelihood of entry.  Of course, for the 
vast majority of markets, this variable is zero: McDonald’s is usually the first entrant by 
far.  The effect, though insignificant, is positive in all cases, suggesting that the markets 
in which Burger King or Wendy’s have already entered are likely to be desirable markets 




Table 12: Duration Analysis – Hazard of Entry into Each Market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Exponential Exponential Exponential Weibull Weibull Weibull 
Log (population) 0.51** 0.52** 0.51** 0.49** 0.49** 0.49** 
 [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] 
Log (gdpcap) 0.79** 0.80** 0.85** 0.78** 0.79** 0.85** 
 [0.15] [0.16] [0.17] [0.16] [0.16] [0.18] 
Urban_rate 1.45 1.41 0.92 1.25 1.23 0.78 
 [1.11] [1.14] [1.20] [1.16] [1.19] [1.23] 
Trade/GDP 0.75** 0.77** 0.80** 0.77** 0.79** 0.82** 
 [0.24] [0.26] [0.25] [0.24] [0.26] [0.25] 
Corporate Tax Rates   2.13+   2 
   [1.25]   [1.25] 
Risk_gdpcap 0.98 0.97 0.22 1.01 1.00 0.27 
 [0.90] [0.89] [0.96] [0.87] [0.86] [0.94] 
Risk_US exchange -40.06 -39.97 -48.18 -41.16 -41.09 -49.04 
 [41.92] [41.91] [48.11] [43.51] [43.51] [49.45] 
Political consistency 0.84 0.84 0.77 1.02 1.01 0.93 
 [0.79] [0.78] [0.81] [0.78] [0.78] [0.81] 
Competitors 0.19 0.18 0.34 0.19 0.19 0.33 
 [0.28] [0.29] [0.28] [0.29] [0.29] [0.28] 
Log (distance) -0.55+ -0.56+ -0.52+ -0.51+ -0.51+ -0.49+ 
 [0.31] [0.31] [0.30] [0.31] [0.31] [0.30] 
Log (foreign markets in) 1.17** 0.95 1.30** 0.53 0.36 0.67 
 [0.33] [0.76] [0.34] [0.58] [0.97] [0.58] 
Log (experience language) 0.20* 0.20* 0.17+ 0.21* 0.20* 0.17+ 
 [0.08] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] 
East Block 0.6 0.59 0.26 1.84* 1.81* 1.52 
 [0.75] [0.75] [0.82] [0.82] [0.80] [0.93] 
Calendar Year  0.02   0.02  
  [0.06]   [0.06]  
Language Fixed Effects Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** 
Constant -13.32** -50.00 -14.87** -13.69** -44.65 -15.07** 
 [3.27] [113.90] [3.35] [3.30] [121.03] [3.38] 
Observations  2,984  2,984  2,439  2,984   2,984  2,439 
# Countries 145 145 124 145 145 124 
Log Likelihood  -53.04 -53.00 -46.49 -52.14 -52.11 -45.64 
Robust standard errors in brackets; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
As for firm characteristics, I find that McDonald’s is more likely to enter new 
markets at time t if it has already done this often (large number of foreign markets 
already in) and if it has more experience in countries within the same language group.  I 
 
 62
also find that the likelihood of entry at any time t is greater for previous eastern block 
countries as expected given that I treat these countries as at risk of entry only once they 
achieve independence. Finally, I note that the large negative values for the constant term 
imply that the baseline hazard is basically zero. 
Focusing on entry rather than the whole process of international expansion of this 
chain, however, ignores much relevant information.  Assuming that expansion or 
diffusion within a market can be modeled using the familiar S-shape pattern, I follow 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld’s (1998) suggestion and specify that the number of outlets in 
market j at time t can be described by 
Yjt = e k1 – (k2/t) 
or, after taking the log of both sides,  
logYjt = k1 – k2/t 
where k1 captures the fact that there is a “target” or optimal number of outlets in the 
market, and k2 captures the friction that prevents the firm from being at this optimal at 
any given time t.  Note in particular that as t becomes larger, k2/t becomes smaller, and 
hence I approach market saturation. 
As expressed, however, the above equation does not include any regressors.  My 
goal is to transform it in such a way as to capture the effect of different variables on the 
target number of outlets and the degree of friction. I therefore rewrite it as follows: 
logY jt = k1(Zjt) – k2(Wjt)/t. 
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I assume specifically that market potential variables affect the target but not the speed of 
expansio, and that factors such as distance and firm experience affect the degree of 
friction but not the desired level of outlets.29 
I summarize in Table 13 the results obtained from examining the firm’s 
expansion, using this specification.  In all cases the regressions include country fixed 
effects among the Zs.  Thus the coefficients on the other Zs capture the effect of changes 
in each variable over time within each country on the target level of stores.  The first two 
columns show results for my full sample.  Because McDonald’s has not achieved 
maturity in many of the markets in my data, I present in the next two columns results 
obtained when I restrict the set of countries to only those that McDonald’s considers its 
major foreign markets (Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the UK).  
Finally, I reproduce the full sample regressions in the last two columns of Table 13 but 
here use outlets/population as my dependent variable. 
                                                 
29 The more traditional approach to estimate a diffusion curve of this type was pioneered by Griliches 
(1957) who used a logistic specification.  Other authors have relied instead on the Gompertz. See e.g. 
Berndt et al. (2003).  In either of these specifications, however, the interaction of variables that enter the 
target and those that enter the friction component of the estimation lead to large number of coefficients to 
be estimated in my setting, and prevent me in particular from including country fixed effects in the target 
equation.  For that reason, I adopted the functional form above which does not suffer from this limitation. 
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Target Parameters       
Log (population) 2.19** 2.12** 0.79 0.75 1.27** 1.20** 
 [0.30] [0.30] [0.80] [0.80] [0.33] [0.33] 
Log (gdpcap) 2.84** 2.86** 2.96** 2.99** 2.94** 2.96** 
 [0.13] [0.13] [0.34] [0.33] [0.14] [0.14] 
Urban_rate 3.04** 3.08** 21.49** 21.32** 2.87* 2.94* 
 [1.08] [1.09] [3.20] [3.18] [1.19] [1.20] 
Trade/GDP -0.11 -0.1 -0.42 -0.46 -0.06 -0.06 
 [0.09] [0.09] [0.46] [0.45] [0.11] [0.11] 
Corporate Tax Rate -0.61* -0.64** -1.80** -1.77** -0.87** -0.88** 
 [0.24] [0.24] [0.64] [0.63] [0.27] [0.28] 
Risk_gdpcap -1.28** -1.32** 0.04 -0.07 -1.58** -1.62** 
 [0.41] [0.41] [2.63] [2.62] [0.48] [0.49] 
Risk_US exchange 0.01 0 -0.37 -0.4 -0.07 -0.07 
 [1.45] [1.45] [1.72] [1.72] [1.55] [1.55] 
Political consistency 0 0 0.24 0.23 0 0 
 [0.14] [0.14] [0.38] [0.38] [0.15] [0.15] 
Competitors 0.16** 0.16** 0.29** 0.29** 0.20** 0.20** 
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.03] 
Country Fixed Effects Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** 
Friction Parameters       
Log (distance) -0.40** -0.20** -0.48* -0.38** -0.45** -0.29** 
 [0.09] [0.03] [0.24] [0.09] [0.10] [0.03] 
Trade/GDP 0.88** 0.86** -1.43 -1.1 1.01** 1.00** 
 [0.06] [0.06] [1.24] [1.00] [0.08] [0.08] 
Log (foreign markets 
in) 0.10+ 0.11+ 1.20** 1.12** 0.14* 0.15* 
 [0.06] [0.06] [0.34] [0.29] [0.06] [0.06] 
Log (experience 
language) -0.04* -0.03+ -0.09+ -0.09+ -0.03+ -0.03 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.05] [0.05] [0.02] [0.02] 
East Block -0.25 -0.22    -0.42* -0.38* 
 [0.16] [0.16]    [0.19] [0.19] 
Ownership Control -0.21** -0.22** -0.27 -0.32+ -0.21** -0.22** 
 [0.05] [0.05] [0.20] [0.16] [0.06] [0.06] 
Calendar Year 0.00*   0   0.00+   
 [0.00]   [0.00]   [0.00]   
Observations  1,063  1,063 195 195 1063 1063 
# Countries 83 83 7 7 83 83 
Log Likelihood  -147.53 -145.51 36.96 37.13 -276.67 -275.68 
Autocorrelation (rho) 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.63 
Robust standard errors in brackets; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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The results in Table 13 imply that the target level of stores is highly positively 
related to indicators of market potential and is negatively related to the corporate tax rate.  
Interestingly, the number of competitors increases the target, suggesting that either 
McDonald’s reacts aggressively to the presence of its main U.S. competitors in these 
markets, or that their presence is taken as a sign of high market potential.  The fact that I 
control for country fixed effects in the regressions, however, implies that the latter effect 
would need to be a dynamic one to be consistent with my results; that is, the increased 
presence of competitors is taken as a sign of increased market potential by McDonald’s.   
As for the variables that I relate to the speed of expansion, I find that distance 
from McDonald’s headquarters, in Chicago IL, reduces significantly the speed at which 
new outlets are added to close the gap between target and actual, as does increased 
ownership control.  McDonald’s total international experience, on the other hand, along 
with a country’s openness to trade, tends to speed up the development of new units within 
each market. The results with respect to the firm’s “culturally relevant” experience, 
however, go counter to my expectations. I am currently exploring further the robustness 
of this and other results. 
3.e. Conclusion 
In this study, I have examined the international expansion process followed by 
one of the most visible American firms to expand abroad, and also a firm that has 
pioneered American fast-food and franchising in several countries.  I found that this 
firm’s pattern of entry into foreign markets and growth easily rejects the notion that 
McDonald’s expanded abroad because it had saturated its home market.  Instead, 
consistent with traditional profit maximization arguments for a firm with market power 
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that faces numerous market opportunities and limited resources, I find evidence that it 
allocated resources to achieve growth across many highly desirable markets. Specifically, 
it enters those markets with the most promising demographics first.  Finally, I have found 
that while growth conditional on entry, and entry itself, share some common features, e.g. 
they are both positively related to a country’s market potential, there are also a number of 
factors that affect entry and expansion differently.  I conclude that it is worthwhile 
considering how service chains expand abroad and going beyond just entry to gain 
further insights in the process and hurdles involved in foreign expansion.
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CHAPTER 4  
WHICH EXPERIENCE MATTERS? 
LEARNING ECONOMIES IN FOREIGN MARKETS 
4.a. Introduction 
Learning economies arise when efficiency gains accompany greater operating 
experience.  Recent strategy research emphasizes the importance of developing and 
exploiting learning economies as a means of achieving competitive advantage.  However, 
studies show that learning economies differ across countries, across industries, across 
firms and even across divisions of the same firm.  One explanation for such differences is 
that there are other sources of knowledge besides operating experience that can reduce 
the need for and value of knowledge gained from direct operating experience. 
Much has been made of the importance of ownership boundaries in impeding 
knowledge transfer.  This study empirically examines the foreign operations of a single 
global franchised fast-food chain to determine which experience matters to outlet 
operating efficiency.  Specifically, I examine how efficiency gains from operating 
experience differs across countries and ascertain just how binding ownership boundaries 
are to knowledge transfer.  I do this by examining the learning economies related to 
different sources of operating experience—own outlet sales, same franchisee outlet sales, 
other franchisee outlet sales, country developer outlet sales, and other country outlet 
sales—within the chain. 
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The analysis employs a unique proprietary dataset of 600,000+ weekly 
observations covering all outlets (2,000+) and 570 distinct business owners of a specific 
franchise chain in 10 foreign markets for the period from 1990 to 2003.  The advantage 
of this extensive dataset on the operations of a single franchised fast-food chain is that it 
enables a relatively high degree of comparability across outlets even when those outlets 
operate in different countries.  This advantage comes at the potential cost of lack of 
generalizability. 
I find that learning economies differ markedly across countries.  Moreover, and 
not surprisingly, recent experience is of greater value than that gained in the past as 
knowledge depreciates by four percent per week.  In contrast to prior findings however, 
my results suggest that knowledge from experience gained at other outlets owned by the 
same franchisee affords no significant learning economies and may introduce 
diseconomies.  Interestingly, knowledge derived from the operating experience of outlets 
owned by country developers appears to matter most.  Not only do franchisee-owned 
outlets within a country experience learning economies from country developer 
experience but such economies exceed even those related to own outlet experience.  
Finally, I find no evidence of efficiency gains associated with the chain’s total foreign 
market operating experience. 
Overall, the findings provide evidence that while ownership boundaries may 
matter, they need not be so important.  In particular, in the franchised setting examined 
here contractual mechanisms seem to induce sizable knowledge transfer.  Within such a 
context, the notion of ownership boundaries may become blurred.  These findings 
challenge the unqualified view that knowledge transfers more readily within firm 
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boundaries than across them.  If contracts can equally or more effectively facilitate 
transfer of knowledge than ownership boundaries, the basic tenet of the knowledge-based 
view of the firm must be reconsidered.  
The chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section, 4.b., I briefly review 
related research.  Section 4.c. describes the study’s empirical setting and data.  Section 
4.d. presents empirical analysis and results for learning economies related to own outlet 
experience.  Section 4.e. extends this to explore the impact of the presence of other 
sources of experience.  Section 4.f. concludes. 
4.b. Related Research 
First studied in the production of pre-World War II aircraft, learning curves 
highlight the phenomenon that as organizations gain experience, the cost of producing 
each additional unit decreases but at a decreasing rate (Wright, 1936).  The learning rate 
reflects the amount of experience required to understand the relationship between a firm’s 
operating practices and the results that they yield.  Also, with repetition employees 
develop greater expertise in performing operating practices.  Alternatively, the learning 
rate may be viewed as the performance gain derived from some period of operating 
experience.  Empirical research on the learning curve has confirmed that this relationship 
between experience and efficiency gains applies to organizations across a wide spectrum 
of economic activity (Dutton and Thomas, 1984; Argote, 1999).   
During the mid-1990s several scholars, observed that organizations progressed 
down the learning curve at different rates. (See e.g. Argote & Epple 1990; Argote, 
Beckman & Epple 1990; Epple, Argote & Davedas 1991)  Furthermore, even within the 
same organization different divisions or subunits learned at different rates.  Out of this 
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basic observation emerged a fundamental overarching research question: Why do some 
organizations learn at faster rates than others? (Argote 1999)  A related question posed by 
Argote and others has directed subsequent enquiry:  Could efficiency gains realized 
within one part of an organization be transferred so as to benefit another part of the 
organization?  (Argote, Ingram, Levine & Moreland 2000; Argote, Beckman & Epple 
2000; Epple, Argote & Murphy 1996; Lapre & Wassenhove 2001; Ingram & Simons 
2002)  Much has been made in this literature of the importance of organizational 
boundaries as an impediment to knowledge transfer. 
The knowledge-based view of the firm ascribes the firm’s very existence to the 
greater efficiency of knowledge transfer within rather than across firm boundaries (Kogut 
& Zander 1991, 1992).  However, it is unclear just exactly what conditions limit the size 
and scope of organizations in this theory; if none exist, a single firm under which all 
economic exchange is organized would seem to represent the most efficient configuration 
to support knowledge flows.  Given some limiting conditions, the question arises as to 
whether firms might employ contracts with outsiders to create higher-powered incentives 
to exploit knowledge more thoroughly.  In short, lower-powered incentives within 
hierarchical structures may prove less effective than contracts under certain 
circumstances in facilitating the transfer of knowledge. 
In their seminal 1995 study, “The Acquisition, Transfer, and Depreciation of 
Knowledge in Service Organizations: Efficiency in Franchises”, Darr, Argote and Epple 
empirically lent credence to the knowledge-based view of the firm.  This study is the 
closest precedent to the present research as it documents the nature of learning-by-doing 
in 36 outlets of a franchised pizza chain operating in western Pennsylvania.   It provides 
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empirical evidence that: (1) unit costs decline with greater production experience, (2) 
knowledge derived from learning by doing depreciates rapidly, and (3) knowledge 
transfers exclusively across stores owned by the same franchisee.  This study has 
influenced much subsequent research as indicated by the frequency with which it has 
been referenced.30 (e.g. Epple, Argote & Murphy 1996; Darr & Kurtzberg 2000; Ingram 
& Simons 2002)  However, as interesting and convincing as the Darr, Argote & Epple 
(1995) findings may be, they remain findings from a sample of only 36 outlets over a 
year and a half.  Given the study’s impact and the importance of its findings in directing 
strategy research, the issue deserves further attention.     
While much attention has been accorded recently to this vein of research in the 
US, relatively little work has been undertaken with regards to knowledge acquisition and 
transfer occurring in and across other national contexts.  International operations 
introduce particular challenges for firms as they must learn to effectively operate in 
unfamiliar settings.  Authors have examined the degree to which knowledge spillovers 
arise from one market to another (Almeida 1996; Jaffee & Trajtenberg 1999).  To my 
understanding, this study is the first to examine acquisition and transfer of knowledge 
within as well as across multiple national settings.31 
Experience, and the knowledge derived from it, holds a prominent position within 
the international business literature explaining foreign market selection and entry mode 
choice.  Lack of knowledge about the business environment of host countries is said to 
introduce a “liability of foreignness”, impeding foreign firms from competing on an equal 
footing with local firms (Hymer, 1960).  Possession of firm-specific competitive 
                                                 
30 118 citations received through April, 2007 
31 Almeida & Phene (2004) examine knowledge transfer within foreign countries but not across them. 
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advantages such as intangible assets is frequently cited as the means by which foreign 
firms remain competitive with local firms (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Caves, 1982; 
Dunning, 1977).  Another means of remaining competitive—as argued in the 
international business research—is by selectively entering foreign markets for which 
prior experience serves to reduce the foreign entrant’s knowledge asymmetry in the host 
market.  This was precisely the focus of the first study within this dissertation.  However, 
international business research has rarely looked beyond entry to examine how firms 
acquire additional knowledge and diffuse it within foreign markets.  A firm adept at such 
skills effectively reduces its liability of foreignness and need worry less about gaining 
experience in one country that may make it easier to enter some subsequent country.  
This study therefore takes an important step beyond entry to directly examine how 
knowledge evolves with increasing foreign market operations. 
Finally, there has been increased recognition recently that there are numerous 
issues associated with measuring the sources of efficiency gains.  Researchers have 
revisited classical learning-curve analyses and identified omitted variables that account 
for a portion of what had been previously thought to be learning economies (Sinclair, 
Klepper, and Cohen, 2000; Thompson, 2001; Thornton & Thompson 2001).  This work 
emphasizes the importance of the right set of controls to effectively identify learning 
economies.  In other words, disentangling learning economies from other sources of 
efficiencies that may correlate with the passage of time has been an important problem.  
This work also underscores the value of employing detailed, firm-specific data with 




4.c. Empirical Setting 
The setting in which I examine learning economies is the foreign operations of a 
franchised fast-food chain.  Although Darr, Argote and Epple’s study was set in the 
context of franchising, relatively less attention has been given to service organizations 
and to my knowledge none within the international context.  This relatively unexplored 
empirical context affords several key benefits to my analysis.  Foremost among them, 
franchised chains by their very nature require a great degree of conformity among the 
different outlets, even when they are situated within different national contexts.  
Franchised outlets sell largely the same products, use the same food inputs and employ 
the same production processes and policies across the entire chain.  Extensive codified 
operating procedures reduce the degree of “tacit” knowledge for outlets within franchised 
chains, potentially reducing the magnitude of learning economies.  Specifically, codified 
procedures are apt to reduce the cost disadvantage that new stores suffer from.  However, 
systematic differences in performance still could arise from knowledge gained through 
outlet experience and from the outlet’s position within the franchised chain’s ownership 
structure. 
4.c.i. Overview 
To maintain confidentiality, I cannot reveal the nature of the items sold or the 
specific countries to which the data refer.   However, the production technology is 
consistent across outlets such that efficiency comparisons among outlets within and 
across country contexts are more reliable than in many other business settings.  The 
database employed in this study is extensive and unique.  The data come directly from the 
fast-food franchisor’s information system and include weekly sales, food and labor costs 
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(all expressed in local currencies) and items sold for all foreign outlets for the years 1990 
through 2003.  In addition, the franchisor provided time-invariant outlet-specific 
information, namely outlet address, and open and close dates (where applicable).  The 
data also includes ownership information for each outlet in 2003, including the name of 
the country developer—the firm responsible for developing a foreign market, the name of 
the current outlet owner and, if acquired, when this current owner took possession of the 
outlet. 
A local country developer may own and operate outlets itself, sub-franchise 
(license) outlets to third party franchisee owners, or engage in both direct ownership and 
sub-franchising, depending on the contractual terms entered into with the franchisor.  Or, 
the franchisor may directly assume the role of country developer.  If so, the franchisor 
directly decides how to divide outlet ownership among franchisee owners and itself.  In 
markets where the franchisor does not assume a direct role as country developer, it 
establishes a contractual relationship with a local firm.  Typically, the contracts involve 
the provision of support and guidance by the franchisor in exchange for royalties 
calculated as a percentage of sales on all outlets operated within the country.  The 
contracts also include mechanisms by which the franchisor can ensure that the local 
country developer maintains the consistency of the brand.  This is important as it leads to 
still greater comparability of outlet performance across countries. 
This study focuses on the top ten foreign markets, measured by the number of 
outlets operating in 2003 as the reliability of the weekly data from these markets appears 
notably better than for other markets.  In other countries, market entry occurs throughout 
the study, resulting in less fully developed ownership structures and fewer outlets to 
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analyze.  Furthermore, the top foreign markets are all developed economies.  This 
diminishes extreme idiosyncratic circumstances that may arise in less developed 
economies, such as coups, hyper inflation and questionable rule of law.  The sample 
includes 675,695 observations and encompasses 2,087 outlets owned by 562 franchisee 
owners and 8 local country developers--either master franchisees (MF) that license 
outlets to franchisee owners or area developers (AD) that retain ownership of all outlets 
within the country.32 
Table 14 provides an overview of the outlets, ownership structure, and the firm’s 
extent of operations within the different countries.  For each country, Table 14 shows the 
type of country developer (MF and AD), outlets opened since entry, outlets that 
underwent a transfer of ownership, outlets closed since entry and a detailed breakdown of 
the ownership structure for outlets still operating at year-end 2003.  The chain was 
present in all countries except country J at the start of the data in 1990 but had opened 
more than two outlets in only four countries (A, B, D and E) by that year.  The significant 
flexibility available to country developers in configuring outlet ownership is reflected in 
the widely varying market ownership structures presented in Table 14.  In some markets, 
there are no outlets or only a few owned by franchisees despite the large total number of 
outlets (Countries E, I and J); in others, there are principally single-outlet franchisee 
owners (Country C); in still others, the country developer owns few if any outlets, instead 
overseeing a mix of multi-outlet and single-outlet franchisee owners (Country G); or, the 
country developer combines franchisees with varying numbers of outlets and country 
developer-owned outlets (Countries A, B, D, F and H).  In concert, these 10 markets 
                                                 
32 In two of the 10 markets (countries F & G) the US franchisor (US) has assumed a direct ownership 
position over some outlets in those countries and directly manages relations with franchisees. 
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afford an interesting variety of ownership structures in which to examine learning 
economies across ownership boundaries. 
Table 14: Country Overview – Breakdown of Outlets and Franchisees 
Country A B C D E F G H I J Total
Developer Type in 2003 MF MF MF MF AD Own Own MF MF AD  
# Opened 























  - Country Developer 14 84 34 27 208 19 1 240 102 105 834
  - Franchisee Owned 262 210 187 284 0 38 90 173 9 0 1,253
# Transferred 128 102 67 124 0 10 28 35 14 0 508
# Closed 68 36 8 22 45 4 36 33 8 31 291
  - Country Developer 0 1 2 1 45 3 0 11 7 31 101
  - Franchisee Owned 68 35 6 21 0 1 36 22 1 0 190
# End of 2003 208 258 213 289 163 53 55 380 103 74 1,796













  - Franchisee Owned 194 175 181 263 0 37 54 151 8 0 1,063
# Franchisee Owners 108 96 171 113 0 19 28 21 7 0 563
    Average # Outlets 1.9 1.9 1.1 2.5  2.1 2.0 7.6 1.3 1.9
        1 outlet 73 62 159 58  8 17 1 4 382
        2 outlets 12 17 8 25  5 6 3 2 78
        3 outlets 7 3  7  3 3   23
        4 outlets 4 7  11  1  3  26
        5 outlets 1 1  3   3  8
        6-10 outlets 4 5 1 4  1  9  24











Maximum 19 9  16  6 16 29  
To meaningfully identify and classify different sources of experience that might 
improve an outlet’s efficiency, I rely upon Figure 1 which offers a stylized schema of the 
ownership structure for a franchised chain.  Consider outlet c3 in country Z.  Its own 
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cumulative experience (indicated by “Cum Own Sales”) should increase c3’s efficiency 
over time. 
Because franchisee C owns more than one outlet however, she can share with 
outlet c3 valuable knowledge gained from operating experience at c1 and c2 so as to 
generate greater efficiency for c3 than she would realize absent other commonly owned 
outlets.  Furthermore, commonly-owned franchisee outlets tend to be proximate to one 
another (Kalnins & Lafontaine 2004), making the operating experience gained in other 
commonly-owned outlets especially relevant.  Relevance moreover makes the experience 
gained at other commonly-owned outlets more likely to be transferred. (Schulz 2003)  
Cumulative experience from commonly-owned franchisee outlets is captured in Figure 1 
by “Cum Same Franchisee Sales”. 
Empirical support for the transfer of experience among commonly owned outlets 
is a key finding of Darr, Argote and Epple’s study.  However, as the number of outlets 
owned by a franchisee increases, it may become more difficult to effectively monitor 
employees of outlets in which the owner is not present.  Such monitoring difficulties may 
make it less efficient to operate several outlets rather than merely one.  Consequently, 
while the incentive is there for the owner to transfer knowledge among commonly-owned 
outlets, it may be more elusive to measure the benefits of such knowledge transfer if there 
exist inefficiencies related to multi-outlet ownership that outweigh the potential gains of 
knowledge transfer.  These would represent costs to multi-outlet ownership that serve to 
define the boundary conditions for expanding the size and scale of the firm.
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The country developer who receives royalty payments from c3 also has an 
incentive to enhance outlet c3’s efficiency by sharing the benefit of experience gained at 
outlets he operates or oversees.33  Finally, cumulative experience gained in outlets within 
other markets outside the country, Z in this case, is represented by “Cum Other Country 
Sales” in Figure 5.  If physical proximity and common ownership facilitate transfer of 
knowledge, one might expect that own outlet experience, commonly-owned outlet 
experience, country developer outlet experience, other within-market franchisee 
experience and foreign country experience sit along a continuum from most likely to least 
likely to enhance outlet-level efficiency.  Cumulative experience garnered at the 
developer outlets is captured by “Cum Developer Sales” in Figure 5, while cumulative 
experience gained at other franchisee outlets within the country that are not owned by 
franchisee C are identified as “Cum Other Franchisee Sales”. 
In the preceding discussion, I have focused on a franchisee-owned outlet.  
Consider now a country developer-owned outlet such as outlet MF1.  In this case, note 
that “Cum Developer Sales” includes cumulative experience gained at other commonly-
owned country developer outlets. 
4.c.ii. The Data 
Before examining the data further, there are several issues to resolve.  First, the 
different local currency denominated sales and costs must be made comparable both 
across countries and over time.  Second, pre-1990 cumulative outlet experience is 
unavailable for a number of outlets in countries A, B, D and E.  Third, measuring 
                                                 
33 Note that Franchisee B may view outlet c3 as a competitor rather than a source of knowledge.  
Nevertheless, the country developer has every incentive to assemble knowledge from all outlets within 
the chain and to diffuse that knowledge throughout the entire chain.  Operating manuals formally codify 
such knowledge in franchise policies and procedures for just this purpose. 
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cumulative experience also requires that production be known for all weeks during the 
study.  Unfortunately, these data are missing in some cases.  Fourth, where an outlet has 
changed hands, I know only the most recent outlet owner.  This introduces two issues.  
On the one hand, unknown ownership prior to transfer reduces the set of usable 
observations.34  If an outlet has changed hands, I only know who took ownership after the 
exchange and not who owned it initially.  On the other hand, it becomes necessary to 
determine how to treat outlet experience (which is available in the data) gained before the 
current owner took possession.  Simply put, to what extent does the new owner reap the 
rewards of outlet experience gained under someone else’s watch?  Finally, as 291 outlets 
were closed during the study period, it is important to determine whether returns to 
experience gained at these outlets differ from those at outlets that remain open throughout 
the entire study. 
To make local currency denominated sales and costs comparable across both 
countries and time, I adopt a measure of efficiency—variable costs per unit of sales 
revenue—whose units are insensitive to currency differences across countries or time.  
For its part, cumulative sales experience is measured in constant year 2000 US dollar 
sales.35  To derive this measure of sales experience I transform the current local currency 
values into year 2000 constant local currency values using the IMF’s International 
                                                 
34 119,117 observations are lost due to transfers of outlet ownership. 
35 I also analyzed the data using variable costs per item sold as the dependent variable and items sold as the 
measure of productive experience in accordance with the approach employed by Darr, Argote and Epple, 
1995.  However, these variables were not normally distributed (see Appendix 5), less availability of 
experience data (items sold), and the fact that items sold would reflect experience associated with burger 
sales but not that from the sale of complementary products (e.g. fries).  For comparative purposes, I also 
include regression results for alternative measures of productivity and experience in Appendix 6. 
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Financial Statistics.  Next, I convert constant currency values into year 2000 $US values 
using the relevant year 2000 exchange rate.36 
For outlets opened pre-1990, I develop estimates of cumulative sales as of 
January 7, 1990 using the following approach.  I calculate a country-specific average 
cumulative outlet sales by week of outlet operation based only on data from 1990 through 
1994 so as to limit potential intervening changes that may arise as the time horizon 
extends out.  Next, I scale the average cumulative sales by week of operation by the size 
of the outlet to which the estimate applies.  Then, I assign the estimate of cumulative 
outlet sales based on the number of weeks of outlet operation on January 7, 1990.37 
Measuring cumulative sales experience requires that ALL weekly sales 
observations be present; otherwise, a measure of cumulative sales after a missing 
observation is inaccurate and as the missing observations increase so too does the 
inaccuracy of the measure.  Fortunately, weekly sales data are present for over ninety-
nine percent of the observations.  I exploit the consistency of sales revenue per item sold 
from week to week for an outlet and across outlets within a given week in a country to 
develop estimates of missing outlet weekly sales data.  The few remaining gaps for 
                                                 
36 Weekly local currency/$US exchange rates were present within the company supplied information 
system.  After verifying their accuracy against IMF data, these data were retained within the study.  
Results were largely unchanged when foreign currency was first exchanged at the current exchange rate 
and then discounted by the US inflation rate.  However, I felt it was theoretically more defendable to 
discount within the local currency as it would seem to provide the least distortion to the value of money 
reflected by the local currency. 
37 Column 2 of Appendix 7 indicates that this approach results in estimated coefficients that are 
significantly lower than observations of uncensored outlets.  However, such a difference may merely 
stem from the fact that censored outlets were opened earlier and thus had more to learn than outlets that 
were opened later within the country. 
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weekly sales are then linearly imputed.  The resulting dataset includes cumulative outlet 
sales for all observations.38 
Given that the data identifies exclusively the new owner when transfers of outlet 
ownership occur, all observations prior to the ownership transfer of an outlet must be 
excluded.  Yet, I must still determine whether or not prior outlet experience carries over 
to the new owner.  I do so by testing whether there is a statistical difference in the 
estimated coefficient of learning economies for outlet experience gained during the six 
month period after outlet ownership transfer.  No such statistically significant difference 
is present.39  Therefore, for this study I assume that new owners gain the full benefit of 
pre-transfer experience and cumulate experience from an outlet’s opening. 
Finally, I test whether there is a substantive difference in learning economies 
where there is sample attrition, closed outlets.  I found no statistically significant 
difference between the learning economies realized by outlets that close during the study 
period as compared to those that remain in operation throughout the study period.40 
4.c.iii. Basic Patterns in the Data 
Figure 6 presents for 2003 the average country-specific weekly variable costs per 
sales dollar in 2003, delineating the constituent parts of food costs and labor costs.  It 
shows that variable costs range from 46% to 63% across the 10 countries in the sample.  
Food costs represent the majority of variable costs for all but two countries, E and G.  
Cross-country variation in labor as a percent of sales is notably greater than that in food 
as a percent of sales. 
                                                 
38 Column 3 of Appendix 7 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between outlets for 
which weekly sales data was imputed versus those for which there was no imputation of data. 
39 See column 4 of Appendix 7. 
40 See column 5 of Appendix 7. 
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This is seen by the fact that labor costs in country G are threefold those in country J while 
the greatest difference for food costs between country F and H is merely 58%.  In sum, 
Figure 6 suggests that there are significant country-level differences in outlet-level 
operating efficiency. 
To better understand the sources of such differences, Table 15 shows the level of 
$Food/ Week, $Labor/Week, and $Sales/Week on average and the percent by which each 
component has changed over the course of the study period for each country.  From Table 
2 one first notes that average outlet efficiency has evolved differently within different 
countries.  On average outlets in countries A, B, D, F, I, and J have experienced 
efficiency gains over the study period while outlets in countries C, E, G, and H have all 
experienced efficiency losses. 
To understand what is driving these changes, one needs to examine how the 
components vary over time.  If the food % change is lower than the sales % change then 
increasing efficiency is derived from how food costs enter operating efficiency; likewise, 
if labor % change is lower than sales % change then increasing efficiency is derived from 
how labor costs enter operating efficiency.  For countries F and J, food costs relative to 
sales declined over time whereas all other countries experienced increases in food costs 
in proportion to sales.  For countries A, B, D, F, and I, labor costs relative to sales 
declined over time whereas other countries experienced increases in labor costs relative 
to sales.  Thus, those countries with operating efficiency gains more often stem from 
labor efficiency gains than food efficiency gains.  Furthermore, in six countries (E, F, G, 
H, I, and J), declining average weekly outlet sales is observed over the study period.
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Table 15: Weekly Sales and Cost Data by Country 
Country A B C D E F G H I J 
Variable Costs/ 
Sales in 2003 0.61 0.54 0.56 0.48 0.55 0.46 0.61 0.51 0.56 0.45 
% change 
since 1990* -0.8% -7.1% 53.5%
Ŧ -4.3% 10.5% -21.7% 13.8% 19.2% -1.1% -13.3% 
$ Sales/Week 
in 2003 $6,392 $9,215 $6,887 $13,917 $14,899 $5,518 $9,620 $10,263 $8,121 $2,643 
% change 
since 1990* 6.5% 105.0% 66.6% 45.6% -34.3% -33.7% -4.1% -70.6% -1.5% -63.2% 
$ Food/Week 
in 2003 $2,303  $2,958 $2,356  $3,476  $3,939 $1,343 $2,731  $3,872 $3,077  $902 
% change 
since 1990* 12.3% 139.7% 127.2% 45.9% -28.5% -49.2% 14.7% -68.9% 21.0% -70.8% 
$ Labor/Week 
in 2003 $1,565 $1,997 $1,491 $3,234 $4,182 $1,212 $3,135 $1,397 $1,482 $296
% change 
since 1990* -2.9% 46.1% 219.3% 32.8% -26.3% -46.8% 4.7% -46.5% -30.7% -55.4% 
* All dollar values are year 2000 constant dollars. Dollar values reflect annual averages for 2003 and percentages are calculated with a base year of 1990 for all 
countries except G and J which respectively have 1991 and 1996 as base years.   
Ŧ In country C, the annual average values for 1990 are based on only a few outlets.  This explains the distinction seen in percentage change for country C versus 
all other countries. 
 86
Thus, the country for which outlets experienced the greatest efficiency gains over the 
study period, country F, benefited from both food and labor cost savings relative to sales.  
However, country H suffered from both food and labor cost reductions that did not equal 
the reduction in sales.  Table 15 reinforces the finding from Figure 6 that there are 
important differences across countries. 
Figure 7 provides a first look at the relationship between median outlet efficiency 
and cumulative outlet operating experience in each country in the sample.  All countries, 
excepting possibly F, seem to exhibit patterns consistent with the presence of learning 
economies, albeit to differing degrees.   It is difficult at this stage to determine whether 
such differences stem from learning economies or scale economies.  However, in the 
empirical analysis, it will be important to examine whether the influence of the level of 
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Finally, Figure 8 depicts the relationship between median outlet efficiency and 
commonly-owned outlet experience, country developer outlet experience, other 
franchisee-owned outlet experience within the same country, and experience from outlets 
in the 9 other major foreign markets for franchisee-owned outlets.  As experience gained 
at commonly-owned outlets increases, as experience gained at country-developer outlets 
increases and as experience gained at outlets operated in the other nine foreign markets 
increases, the median efficiency level of an outlet appears to improve; this does not occur 
for experience gained at outlets owned by other franchisees within the same country.  
However, as these are simple plots of the data, they do not control for other factors that 
may be correlated with experience.  In what follows, I examine the separate effect of 
these different sources of within-chain experience on outlet-specific efficiency. 
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Figure 8: Outlet Operating Efficiency vs. Cumulative Sales from Other Outlets 
  


























0 25,000,000 50,000,000 75,000,000
Cumulative Sales* at Other Commonly-Owned Outlets
*Sales measured in constant year 2000 US dollars.

























0 200,000,000 400,000,000 600,000,000 800,000,000
Cumulative Sales* at Country Developer-Owned Outlets
*Sales measured in constant year 2000 US dollars.
Excludes country G which has only 1 country developer-owned outlet.  
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4.d. Learning From Own Experience 
4.d.i. Estimating Strategy & Model Specification 
My empirical specification relies upon the classical learning curve framework that 
mathematically models the fact that average variable costs tend to decline with increasing 
experience but at a diminishing rate.  To model this relationship, the classical learning 
curve specification is as follows: 
efficiencyit = α0 (Cum Own Salesit)-α1 
where efficiencyit is a measure of cost of production for outlet i in week t,  “α0” 
represents the cost of producing the first unit, Cum Own Salesit reflects outlet i’s 
cumulative production through time t, and the parameter α1 reflects the cost reduction 
accompanying greater production experience.  In logarithmic form, one gets:  
 ln Efficiencyit = ln α0 + α1 ln Cum Own Salesit + Σ β Controlsit + eit 
Controls are introduced to identify the independent effect of outlet experience on 
operating efficiency.  In alternative specifications, I control for (1) economies of scale 
during the current week (Sales) and (2) technological change or changes in food or labor 
costs over the study period with country-specific linear time trends (CountryxTime).  For 
all specifications, I employ a fixed-effects model that controls for unobserved outlet-level 
heterogeneity.  In the presence of outlet-specific fixed effects that are correlated with the 
explanatory variables, fixed effects models are consistent but random effects models are 
not.  To test for this correlation, I ran a Hausman test.  A significant statistical difference 
between the results from these two specifications provided evidence that the fixed effects 
are correlated with the other explanatory variables, and dictated use of a fixed-effects 
model rather than a random effects model.  I cluster residuals on outlets to flexibly 
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account for distinct error structures by outlet.  Unless noted otherwise, all subsequent 
regressions are run using outlet-specific fixed effects with residuals clustered on outlets. 
I also examine how the relationship between efficiency and own sales varies by 
country by allowing α1c to denote 10 distinct country-specific coefficients.  Note that the 
dependent variable and all experience variables are logged but for simplicity in reporting 
regression tables “log” is omitted.   In Table 16 below I summarize the key variables 
employed.  i indexes individual outlets, t indexes week of study period, and c indexes 
country. 
Table 16: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
H Number of outlets owned by franchisee, excluding outlet i 
J Number of outlets owned by other franchisees in country 
D Number of outlets owned by developer that aren’t outlet i 
K Number of outlets in countries different from that of outlet i 
efficiencyit log [(food costs + labor costs)/Sales] 
salesit log [Sales in constant year 2000 $US for i in period t] 
Cum Own Salesit log [ΣT=1 to t-1 SalesiT]  
Cum Same 
Franchisee Salesit 
log [Σi=1 to H Cum Own Salesit] – Cum Own Salesit 
Cum Developer Salesit log [Σi=1 to Dt Cum Own Salesit] – Cum Own Salesit 
Cum Other 
Franchisee Salesit 
log [Σi=1 to Jt Cum Own Salesit] – Cum Own Salesit 
Cum Other Country 
Salesit 
log [Σi=1 to Kt Cum Own Salesit] – Cum Own Salesit 
Country Country dummy variable 
Weekt Time trend  
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4.d.ii. Learning Economies from Own Experience 
Table 17 presents several models for estimating learning economies associated 
with own outlet experience.  Column 1 presents the most basic model which merely 
estimates a single coefficient of learning economies derived from cumulative own outlet 
sales.  This model assumes that learning is the same across all countries.  It controls for 
economies of scale that are likewise assumed to be common across all countries.  The 
results indicate the presence of both learning and scale economies; a doubling of sales 
experience is estimated to be accompanied by a 0.46% increase in efficiency (negative 
sign reflects the decrease in operating costs/sales dollar) whereas a doubling of sales 
during a given week is estimated to be accompanied by a 16.18% increase in efficiency. 
In subsequent models depicted in Table 17, I explore the value of introducing 
country-specific time trends, relaxing the assumptions of common learning and scale 
economies across countries, and testing for the possibility that learning economies vary 
with the level of experience.  The model estimated in Column 2 introduces country-
specific time trends.  This has the effect of quite significantly increasing the model’s fit 
as reflected by the marked increase in Log Likelihood.  The model in Column 2 also has 
the effect of notably increasing particularly learning but also scale economies by 320% 
and 15% respectively.  Consequently, all subsequent models control for technological 
changes and changes in food or labor costs over the study period with country-specific 
linear time trends. 
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Table 17: Learning Economies from Own Sales Experience 
Dependent= Efficiency (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cum Own Sales -0.0046 -0.0147    
  0.0008** 0.0009**    
Cum Own Sales A -0.0112 -0.0123 -0.0129
    0.0024** 0.0023** 0.0023** 
Cum Own Sales B -0.0040 -0.0031 -0.0029
    0.0023 0.0023 0.0024 
Cum Own Sales C -0.0012 -0.0066 -0.0067
    0.0025 0.0021** 0.0021** 
Cum Own Sales D -0.0204 -0.0231 -0.0231
    0.0024** 0.0023** 0.0023** 
Cum Own Sales E -0.0423 -0.0379 -0.0362
    0.0025** 0.0023** 0.0023** 
Cum Own Sales F -0.0257 -0.0126 -0.0129
    0.0060** 0.0064 0.0064* 
Cum Own Sales G -0.0210 -0.0197 -0.0196
    0.0036** 0.0036** 0.0036** 
Cum Own Sales H -0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0036
    0.0013** 0.0012** 0.0013** 
Cum Own Sales I -0.0100 -0.0073 -0.0069
    0.0017** 0.0015** 0.0014** 
Cum Own Sales J -0.0147 -0.0114 -0.0120
    0.0042** 0.0041** 0.0041** 
Cum Own Sales1st$500K -0.0005 
     0.0002*  
Cum Own Salespost$5M 0.0010 
    0.0002**  
Sales -0.1618 -0.1863 -0.1840  
 0.0046** 0.0042** 0.0042**   
Sales x Countryi No No No Yes Yes 
Weekt x Countryi No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Observations  597,018 597,018 597,018 597,018  597,018 
 Number of Outlets  1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899  1,899 
 Log Likelihood  483,345 504,078 507,487 519,028  518,716 
All regressions include outlet fixed effects; residuals are clustered on outlets.   
Errors below: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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The model in Column 3 allows learning economies to vary by country.  All 
coefficients estimated are signed correctly but countries B and C prove statistically 
insignificant.  The effect of doubling outlet sales experience is associated with between a 
0.12% and a 4.23% increase in efficiency (respectively for countries C and E).  Once 
again, the Log Likelihood results indicate that this model is superior to that in Column 2.  
The initial review of data in the previous section suggested that significant country-
specific differences existed.  I should note in passing that in moving from the model in 
column 2 to Column 3, there is little impact on the estimated scale economies (-0.1840 
vs. -0.1863). 
In Column 4, the model both allows scale economies to vary by country and 
examines whether the efficiency gains to own outlet experience differ depending upon 
the level of outlet experience when the additional experience is gained.  Cum Own 
Sales1st$500K captures the difference in learning economies for outlets with less than 
$500,000 in cumulative sales, representing between 30 and 160 weeks of outlet operation 
depending on the country in which outlet operates.  Cum Own Salespost$5M relates to 
observations where the outlet has cumulative sales in excess of $5 million—greater than 
from 214 to 744 weeks of outlet operation depending on the country considered.  During 
the initial period of operation the outlet does experience slightly higher rates of learning 
economies and in later stages the learning economies decline.  The former finding likely 
stems from improvements that outlets discover early on through learning by doing.  The 
latter could be a reduced rate of learning or alternatively an obsolescence of the facilities 
and the associated decline in efficiency.  As learning economies are only fractionally 
larger during the early period of outlet operation and worse during the later period of the 
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outlet operation, in subsequent analyses herein I assume that learning economies 
(diseconomies) are invariant to the level of outlet experience. 
Column 5 retains the assumption of country-specific scale economies that 
significantly increase the model’s fit, based again on the log likelihood results.  However, 
as the focus of this study is on learning economies, I do not report the detailed country-
specific scale economies herein.  The model in Column 5 will be retained in the 
subsequent analyses within this study.41 
Combined, the results in Table 17 show that in all countries greater outlet-specific 
experience seems to reduce variable costs per dollar of sales.  This occurs no matter the 
controls employed.  However, the magnitude of such economies is highly sensitive to the 
inclusion of controls, particularly the country-specific linear time trend.  Furthermore, in 
the best model (Column 5) each doubling of cumulative sales experience is accompanied 
by an efficiency gain (reduction in variable costs per sales dollar) of between 0.3% and 
3.6%, depending on the country.  This range of efficiency gain stemming from outlet-
specific learning is much lower than the 7% found for pizza stores (Darr, Argote and 
Epple, 1995) and lower still than the 20% to 30% found in manufacturing (Dutton and 
Thomas, 1984, Argote & Epple, 1990, Benkard, 2000). 
4.d.iii. Depreciation of Own Experience 
In Table 17, I assumed that 100% of last week’s experience remains available this 
week.  While that may seem reasonable, it also has the implication that experience gained 
several years ago is as influential as experience gained last week.  Put another way, the 
                                                 
41 A table of pair-wise F-tests assessing the equivalence between different country-specific learning 
economies is presented in Appendix 7.  This suggests that countries B, C, H, and I have similar learning 
rates to one another.  Likewise, countries A and G form another group.  Countries F and J form a third 
group.  Finally, outlets in countries D and E each exhibit their own distinctive learning economies.  Joint 
F-tests for these groupings support what is suggested in Appendix 7. 
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assumption of no depreciation implies that the estimated coefficient is the net effect of 
learning and forgetting.  To estimate the percent of experience retained from week to 
week, I use the equation below to discount the prior week’s experience and undertake a 
grid search to maximize the model’s fit.   
 *Cum Own Salesit = λ Salesit-1 + λ 2 Salesit-2 + … + λ t-1 Salesi1 
λ serves to depreciate the value of sales experience gained from the previous week and is 
assumed to be invariant across outlets and weeks.  Consequently, last week’s sales are 
multiplied by λ, sales from two weeks ago are multiplied by λ2, sales from three weeks 
ago are multiplied by λ3, and so on.  These depreciated weekly sales figures are then 
cumulated.  The result is to give greater weight to more recent experience and 
progressively less weight to increasingly distant experience.  In short, this discounting 
introduces a notion of knowledge retention into the model.  The methodology follows 
that employed in Darr, Argote and Epple.  Throughout the remainder of this chapter, a 
“*” preceding an experience variable (e.g. *Cum Own Sales) indicates that the 
experience variable reflects knowledge as depreciating over time. 
In Table 18, I present the results from using the estimating model from column 5 
of Table 17.  Each of the 5 estimating models in Table 18 is identical in all respects, 
except for the assumed rate of knowledge retention from week to week.  Columns 1 to 5 
reflect assumptions of 90%, 93%, 96%, 99%, and 100% retention of the prior week’s 
stock of cumulated knowledge.  Alternatively stated, these columns reflect 10%, 7%, 4%, 
1%, and 0% weekly depreciation.  The assumption of 96% retention (or 4% depreciation) 
of knowledge weekly best fit the data estimated and is retained in analyses hereafter. 
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Table 18: Learning Economies from DEPRECIATED Own Sales Experience 
Dependent=Efficiency (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
*Cum Own SalesA -0.0127 -0.0133 -0.0136 -0.0128 -0.0129
  0.0028** 0.0028** 0.0027** 0.0024** 0.0023** 
*Cum Own SalesB -0.0076 -0.0070 -0.0059 -0.0040 -0.0029
  0.0020** 0.0021** 0.0022** 0.0024 0.0024 
*Cum Own SalesC 0.0037 0.0023 -0.0002 -0.0054 -0.0067
  0.0020 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021* 0.0021** 
*Cum Own SalesD -0.0252 -0.0259 -0.0264 -0.0246 -0.0231
  0.0020** 0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0023** 0.0023** 
*Cum Own SalesE -0.0691 -0.0667 -0.0611 -0.0438 -0.0362
  0.0032** 0.0031** 0.0030** 0.0025** 0.0023** 
*Cum Own SalesF -0.0156 -0.0153 -0.0146 -0.0133 -0.0129
  0.0071* 0.0068* 0.0065* 0.0062* 0.0064* 
*Cum Own SalesG -0.0194 -0.0201 -0.0207 -0.0200 -0.0196
  0.0035** 0.0035** 0.0036** 0.0037** 0.0036** 
*Cum Own SalesH -0.0035 -0.0037 -0.0039 -0.0036 -0.0036
  0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0013** 0.0013** 
*Cum Own SalesI -0.0034 -0.0041 -0.0050 -0.0063 -0.0069
  0.0017 0.0017* 0.0017** 0.0015** 0.0014** 
*Cum Own SalesJ -0.0081 -0.0088 -0.0098 -0.0113 -0.0120
  0.0043 0.0043* 0.0042* 0.0041** 0.0041** 
% of prior week’s 
knowledge retained (λ) 
90% 93% 96% 99% 100% 
 Observations  597,018 597,018 597,018 597,018  597,018 
 Number of Outlets  1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899  1,899 
 Log Likelihood  519,194 519,512 519,740 519,134  518,716 
All regressions include outlet fixed effects, country-specific linear time trends, country-specific controls for 
scale; residuals are clustered on outlets.  Errors below: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%;  
** significant at 1%. 
The substantive impact of 96% versus 100% knowledge retention is to increase 
the learning economies to own outlet sales experience for all countries except C, I and J.  
The most prominent change arises in country E which witnesses a rise from a 3.6% to a 
6.1% improvement in efficiency with a doubling in outlet-specific experience.  After two 
years almost all of the knowledge is lost.  Thus, the 96% may seem a bit high but 
 
 98
nonetheless remains within what is intuitively reasonable regarding the retention of 
knowledge over time.  The 96% weekly rate of retention diverges greatly from that of 
83% found by Darr, Argote and Epple but is much closer to the 99% weekly rate 
estimated by Benkard in a study of learning and spillovers in aircraft production 
(Benkard 2000).  Whenever a “*” precedes an experience variable hereafter it should be 
understood to represent 96% knowledge retention from week to week. 
4.d.iv. Variability of Learning Economies from Own Experience 
While Table 17 and Table 18 presented the expected average learning economies, 
they shed little light on the dispersion around those averages.  With Table 19, one can 
inspect how widely the learning economies vary across outlets within a country.  In so 
doing, I aim to understand the basis upon which the differences in country-specific 
learning economies estimated earlier rests.  In short, I am asking to what degree are such 
differences a function of the distribution of outlet-specific learning economies and the 
possible influence of outliers? 
In Table 19, I present the results of running 1,860 distinct outlet-specific OLS 
regressions on a sample of outlets that have been open more than 52 weeks and have at 
least 25 observations.  In short, the sample is based on outlets that have ample experience 
from which to develop estimates of learning economies.  Regressions are based on the 
below equation: 
ln efficiencyt = α0 + α1 ln*Cum Own Salest + β1 ln Salest + β2 Timet + et  
I should note that simple means calculated by country in Table 19 will certainly differ 
from those in Table 17 and Table 18 because Table 19 calculates simple means based on 
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estimates of outlet-specific (1) learning economies, (2) scale economies, and (3) linear 
time trends rather than those calculated at the country-level within a single regression 
equation. 
Table 19: Variability of Outlet-Specific Learning Economies 
   Coefficient Range of Estimated Learning Economies 
 # 
Outlets Mean <-0.15 
-0.15 
to      
-0.10 
-0.10  














*Cum Own Sales 1,860  -0.013 77 69 211 864 490 70 27 61
A *Cum Own Sales 253  0.013 18 8 15 97 57 11 14 33
B *Cum Own Sales 247  -0.016 16 10 26 103 62 18 8 4
C *Cum Own Sales 203  0.017 1 1 4 64 116 15 1 1
D *Cum Own Sales 271  -0.006 4 12 42 151 38 5 1  18
E *Cum Own Sales 205  -0.093 36 30 87 41 8 1 1  1
F *Cum Own Sales 52  -0.013 1 1 10 23 9 6 1 1
G *Cum Own Sales 77  -0.016 2 9 53 8 3  2
H *Cum Own Sales 352  -0.005 2 8 205 139 7 
I  *Cum Own Sales 111  -0.008 1 75 34 1  
J *Cum Own Sales 89  -0.011 3 10 52 19 3 1  1
The learning economies are higher in Table 19 versus Table 18 for countries B, C, 
E, F, and G whereas such they are lower for countries A, D, H, I, and J.  This is largely a 
function of the heterogeneity of outlets within different countries.  For instance, in 
country A, 33 outlets experience a worsening of efficiency of more than 15% with each 
doubling of experience!  Likewise, country C has 20 outlets that experience efficiency 
gains of more than 15% with each doubling of outlet experience!  These findings do 
contribute to explaining the country-specific differences in learning economies estimated 
earlier and suggest an interesting future research opportunity to examine why such 
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outliers exist and to what degree these are related to ownership.42  However, it seems 
unlikely that such country-specific differences stem merely from the impact of such 
outliers. 
Taken together, these analyses of learning economies from own sales experience 
yield the following results.  First, outlets derive benefits in the form of efficiency gains 
stemming from their own operating experience.   However, these benefits are notably less 
than had been found in earlier studies of franchised retail chains (Darr, Argote & Epple).  
Second, such benefits differ across countries (as do the scale economies).  This suggests 
the importance of country developer policies and country context as factors influencing 
the strength of learning economies.  This view is further strengthened by the difference in 
the dispersion of outlet-specific estimates of learning economies by countries in Table 19.  
Third, experience was found to depreciate by 4% from one week to the next.  Thus, 
experience gained more than 2 years ago has little effect on outlet efficiency.  
4.e. Learning with Multiple Possible Sources of Experience 
4.e.i. Estimating Strategy and Model Specification 
In addition to estimating the benefits of one’s own production experience, the 
learning curve framework has been extensively used to examine returns derived from 
related other experience, be it from affiliated production facilities (Thornton & 
Thompson 2001), associated product lines (Epple, Argote & Murphy 1996; Lapre & Van 
Wassenhove 2002), or even industry or competitor experience (Irwin & Klenow 1994).  
Accordingly, I incorporate the sources of experience identified in Figure 5 into the 
learning curve framework as follows: 
                                                 
42 An extensive battery of analyses yielded no significant relationship between poor performance and outlet 
closings, timing of outlet operation, who owns the outlet, or the number of outlets owned. 
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ln efficiencyit =  ln α0 + α1c ln *Cum Own Salesit + α2 ln *Cum Same Franchisee Salesit  
 + α3c ln *Cum Developer Salesit + α4 ln *Cum Other Franchisee Salesit  
 + α5 ln *Cum Other Country Salesit + Σ β Controls + eit 
where α1c, α2, α3c, α4, and α5 capture respectively learning economies from: own outlet 
sales, other commonly-owned outlet sales, country developer-owned outlet sales, other 
franchisee-owned outlet sales in the same market, and chain outlet sales in other 
countries.  α1 and α3 are subscripted with c to denote country as I estimate country-
specific learning economies for *Cum Own Sales as before and now for *Cum 
Developer Sales.  In unreported regressions, I likewise explored such country-specific 
coefficients for *Cum Same Franchisee Sales, *Cum Other Franchisee Sales and 
*Cum Other Country Sales.  These did not significantly enhance the model fit using a 
likelihood ratio test.  Furthermore, such more complicated specifications ask too much of 
the information contained in the data.  As before, note that the dependent variable and all 
experience variables are logged but for simplicity in regression tables “log” is omitted. 
Table 7 reports estimating results for three different outlet owner types—single-
outlet franchisees, multi-outlet franchisees, and country-developers—as the sources of 
experience available to each differ.  For instance, single-outlet franchisees do not have 
access to experience from other commonly-owned outlets and country developers’ 
commonly-owned outlet is captured in the variable *Cum Developer Sales.  In columns 1 
and 2, I focus on single-outlet franchisee owned outlets; in columns 3 and 4, I focus on 
multi-outlet franchisee owned outlets; and in columns 5 and 6, I focus on country-
developer owned outlets.  For each of these three groups, the first column assumes a 
common rate of learning economies from country developer outlets whereas the second 
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relaxes this assumption to allow for country-specific learning economies related to 
country-developer experience.  In this section of the study, I draw extensively upon Table 
20 findings to examine (1) the effect of other experience on learning from own 
experience; (2) learning from other commonly-owned outlets; and (3) learning from 
different owner outlets. 
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Table 20: Learning Economies from Different Sources for Different Owners 
Sampled Outlets Single-Outlet Franchisees 
Multi-Outlet 
Franchisees 
 Country Developer 
Owners 
Dependent: Efficiency (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
*Cum Own Sales A -0.0094 -0.0099 -0.0073 -0.0072 -0.0231 -0.024
  0.0058 0.0058 0.0035* 0.0035* 0.0145 0.0138
*Cum Own Sales B -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0083 -0.0089 -0.0102
  0.0046 0.005 0.0052 0.0051 0.0038* 0.0035**
*Cum Own Sales C -0.0036 -0.0038 -0.0104 -0.008 0.0043 0.0024
 0.0027 0.0027 0.0056 0.0068 0.0069 0.0076
*Cum Own Sales D -0.0255 -0.0257 -0.0231 -0.0232 -0.0237 -0.0193
  0.0034** 0.0033** 0.0038** 0.0038** 0.0068** 0.0065**
*Cum Own Sales E    -0.0597 -0.059
   0.0030** 0.0030**
*Cum Own Sales F -0.0134 -0.0127 -0.0123 -0.0143 -0.0018 -0.0028
  0.0143 0.0151 0.0078 0.0077 0.0195 0.0194
*Cum Own Sales G -0.0136 -0.0155 -0.0105 -0.0141  
  0.0074 0.0074* 0.0047* 0.0044**  
*Cum Own Sales H -0.0052 -0.0035 -0.0046 -0.0041 -0.0025 -0.0024
 0.0032 0.0025 0.0022* 0.0022 0.0016 0.0016
*Cum Own Sales I -0.0195 -0.0172 0.034 -0.1327 -0.0054 -0.0062
 0.0044** 0.0050** 0.0365 0.0047** 0.0017** 0.0017**
*Cum Own Sales J    -0.0071 -0.0074
     0.0043 0.0042 
*Cum Same Franchisee Sales  0.0074 0.0076  
  0.0026** 0.0025**  
*Cum Developer Sales -0.0342 -0.0132  -0.088 
  0.0124** 0.0064*  0.0134** 
*Cum Developer Sales A  0.0176  -0.0298  0.1242
  0.0387 0.0150*  0.0733
*Cum Developer Sales B  -0.0831  0.0377  -0.0274
  0.0262** 0.0287  0.0134*
*Cum Developer Sales C  -0.0427  0.2645  0.1399
  0.0180* 0.0686**  0.0331**
*Cum Developer Sales D  -0.1058  -0.0276  0.1841
  0.092 0.0380  0.1089
*Cum Developer Sales E     -0.1265
    0.0079**
*Cum Developer Sales F  -0.2278  -0.1552  -0.0861
  0.0825** 0.0513**  0.0325**
*Cum Developer Sales G  -0.0136  0.0035  
  0.0175 0.0056  
*Cum Developer Sales H  -0.1362  -0.0872  -0.0697
  0.0574* 0.0232**  0.0227**
*Cum Developer Sales I  -0.1679  0.266  -0.0302
  0.0477** 0.0472**  0.0154
*Cum Developer Sales J     -0.0794
    0.0322*
*Cum Other Franchisee Sales 0.0634 0.0903 -0.0273 -0.0078 0.013 -0.0014
  0.0150** 0.0171** 0.0129* 0.0184 0.0043** 0.0041
*Cum Other Country Sales 0.0106 0.0449 -0.0172 -0.0316 0.0761 0.0802
  0.0432 0.0522 0.0204 0.0227 0.0161** 0.0169**
Sales x Countryi Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekt x Countryi Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 # Outlets  443 443 758 758 783 783
 Observations  82,967 82,967 162,724 162,724 240,815 240,815
 Log Likelihood  69,640 69,810 149,767 150,180 226,110 226,949
All regressions include outlet-specific fixed effects and clustered residuals.  Errors below: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.   
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4.e.ii. Learning from Own Experience when Other Experience is Present 
Relative to results from Table 18 which omitted other possible sources of 
learning, we generally observe in Table 20 a decline in learning economies from own 
experience, suggesting that other sources of learning may displace own outlet learning 
where available.  This notion is supported by the fact that single outlet franchisees tend to 
have greater learning economies from own experience than do either multi-outlet 
franchisee outlets or country developer outlets.  This should not be surprising, given that 
single-outlet franchisees do not have access to other commonly-owned outlets by the 
franchisee.  When comparing the learning economies from own experience for multi-
outlet franchisee outlets to those for country developer outlets, no general trends seem to 
emerge. 
4.e.iii. Learning from Other Commonly-Owned Outlets 
Given the findings from section 4.e.ii., that multi-outlet franchisees do not learn 
as much from own outlet experience as single-outlet franchisees, one would expect 
learning economies to be present for experience gained at other commonly-owned 
franchisee outlets.  Surprisingly, this is not so.  What’s more, estimates suggest learning 
diseconomies from commonly owned outlets for multi-outlet franchisee owners.  This is 
particularly puzzling.  To explain this finding, in Table 21 I examine whether learning of 
commonly-owned franchisee outlets varies by sequence of outlet opening?  One might 
well expect that the first or second outlets opened by a franchisee do not benefit from 
subsequently opened outlets but such later outlets may benefit from experience gained at 
the outlets opened earlier.  To control for possible differences in abilities of franchisee 
owners that have been allocated only one or a few outlets by country developers relative 
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to those with more, I limit my sample to franchisee owners that as of the end of the study 
period have four or more outlets.  Also, I only include countries where there are at least 5 
franchisee owners in 2003 so as to have a minimum of information in the data.   I first 
Table 21: Learning Economies by Order of Franchisee Outlet Opening 
Sampled Outlets
†
 4 country A B D H 
Dependent= Efficiency (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
*Cum Own Sales1st Opened -0.007 0.0995 -0.0202 -0.0053 -0.0096
 0.0034* 0.0349** 0.019 0.0073 0.0026** 
*Cum Own Sales2nd Opened -0.0081 -0.0031 0.0024 -0.0192 -0.0032
 0.0054 0.0084 0.0136 0.0105 0.0057 
*Cum Own Sales3rd Opened -0.0196 -0.0165 0.0478 -0.0284 -0.0145
 0.0078* 0.0196 0.0442 0.0136* 0.0104 
*Cum Own Sales4th Opened -0.0103 -0.0171 -0.0022 -0.0127 -0.008
 0.0037** 0.0064* 0.0059 0.0067 0.006 
*Cum Same Franchisee Sales1st 0.0088 -0.0045 0.0106 0.0074 0.0083
 0.0026** 0.0066 0.0105 0.0035* 0.0032* 
*Cum Same Franchisee Sales 2nd 0.0041 -0.0221 0.0128 0.0448 -0.0219
 0.0147 0.013 0.0153 0.0293 0.0221 
*Cum Same Franchisee Sales 3rd -0.0164 -0.0226 -0.0078 -0.0265 -0.0183
 0.0256 0.0313 0.0441 0.0509 0.0463 
*Cum Same Franchisee Sales 4th -0.0683 -0.0029 0.1185 -0.0313 -0.1125
 0.0382 0.0379 0.1186 0.0635 0.0732 
Sales -0.1734 -0.1786 -0.1711 -0.1734
  0.0154** 0.0866* 0.0159** 0.0116** 
Sales x Country A -0.1355   
 0.0222**     
Sales x Country B -0.1729   
 0.0836*     
Sales x Country D -0.1677   
 0.0157**     
Sales x Country H -0.1783   
 0.0113**     
Franchisee Sales -0.0099 0.0008 -0.0039 -0.007 -0.0113
 0.0033** 0.0092 0.0125 0.0041 0.0036** 
Outlets  177 24 33 65 55
Observations 40,467 8,664 4,304 14,695 12,804
 Log Likelihood  35,141 11,289 5,001 10,651 10,352
All regressions include outlet-specific fixed effects and country-specific linear time trends; residuals are clustered on 
outlets.  Errors indicated below: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
present findings related to the sample of the combined set of countries A, B, D, and H in 
Column 1.  Then, in Columns 2 through 5, I present country-specific regression results 
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independently for comparative purposes.  I limit my discussion below to the aggregate 
sample results presented in column 1. 
At the outlet level, results indicate that up through the third outlet learning 
economies from own-outlet experience increase as franchisees sequentially open 
additional outlets.  However, with the fourth outlet such learning economies decline.  
This would seem to suggest that outlet-specific learning benefits in some way from 
having opened earlier outlets.  While insignificant, learning economies related to 
experience gained at other commonly owned outlets (*Cum Same Franchisee Sales) 
increase with the number of the outlet opened by a franchisee owner.   Unfortunately, the 
results reflected in Table 21 do not help to explain the earlier finding that experience at 
other commonly owned outlets are accompanied by learning diseconomies rather than 
learning economies. 
One possible explanation for this puzzling finding is that franchise owners realize 
diseconomies related to managing a larger scale of outlets.  As the owner cannot be in 
multiple locations simultaneously, she is not able to effectively oversee the daily 
operations of several outlets.  Hence, the efficiency of those outlets declines.  However, 
when I control for economies of scale related to sales in other commonly-owned outlets, 
learning diseconomies from experience at commonly-owned outlets persists. 
There is another explanation that I am reluctant to accept.  It could be that 
franchisee owners mistakenly transfer knowledge from one outlet to another that hinders 
outlet efficiency.  For instance, if one outlet’s customers all preferred to purchase food at 
the counter then the franchisee may configure a subsequently opened store accordingly.  
However, if customers of  that subsequently-opened store preferred to purchase food at 
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the drive through window, then the outlet may well prove less efficient in meeting 
customers’ needs.  This is an unsatisfying explanation in that it relies upon mistakes by 
the franchisee owners and I am uncomfortable making such an assumption about human 
rationality (or irrationality). 
4.e.iv. Learning from Different Owner Outlets 
The three sources of experience from non-owned outlets explored herein are from 
other franchisee experience within the country of the focal outlet (*Cum Other 
Franchisee Sales), country-developer experience within the country of the focal outlet 
(*Cum Developer Sales), and experience gained within the other nine countries (*Cum 
Other Country Sales).   
I consider the influence of experience gained at country developer outlets (*Cum 
Developer Sales) on the efficiency of franchisee outlets.  I now return to discussing 
results in Table 20.  In columns 1 and 3, I assume a common rate of learning economies 
across all countries for experience gained at country developer outlets.   For both single-
outlet and multi-outlet franchisees, experience gained at country-developer owned outlets 
has a significant efficiency-enhancing effect on franchisee outlets.  Interestingly, a 
doubling of country developer experience is associated with a 3.4% gain in efficiency at 
single-outlet franchisees whereas it is associated with only a 1.3% gain in efficiency at 
multi-outlet franchisees.  This is consistent with the fact that single-outlet franchisees 
cannot draw upon experience gained at other commonly-owned outlets and thus may rely 
more on the experience of the country developer to direct them.  However, we observed 
earlier that common ownership for multi-outlet franchisees actually had either no effect 
or a negative effect on efficiency. 
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In columns 2 and 4, I obtain distinct country-specific estimates of learning 
economies to country developer experience for single and multi-outlet franchisees.  By so 
doing, perhaps insight can be gained regarding the difference between single and multi 
outlet efficiency gains associated with country developer experience.  With the exception 
of country A, all countries exhibit higher learning economies to country developer 
experience for single-outlet franchisees than for multi-outlet franchisees.  For all 
countries in which learning economies to country developer experience for single-outlet 
franchisees are significant, there exist efficiency gains associated with greater country 
developer experience.  However, in the case of multi-outlet franchisees, while countries 
A, F, and H also realized efficiency gains from country developer experience, countries C 
and I exhibit significant and sizable efficiency losses associated with greater levels of 
country developer experience.  For both countries C and I, a doubling of country 
developer experience is associated with a 26% decline in efficiency.  These findings 
concerning country developer experience reinforce the earlier findings that country 
developer actions and policies are critically important to how a country benefits from the 
experience it gains in foreign markets.  Specifically, it suggests that experience gained at 
country developer outlets is more influential than that gained by franchisee outlets.  This 
would seem to imply that country developers within the chain examined are vital to the 
development of foreign markets and exert considerable control and influence over 
franchisees in those markets, for better or worse.   
Next, I consider whether experience gained at other franchisee owners affords 
learning economies to a focal outlet.  While different franchisee owners may compete at 
some level for customers, the country developer can serve to diffuse valuable efficiency 
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enhancing practices discovered at one franchisee owner to another.  For single-franchisee 
owners, other franchisee experience has a detrimental effect on efficiency.  Each 
doubling of experience by other franchisees is associated with a 6-9% decrease in 
efficiency.  For multi-outlet franchisees, it appears as though greater experience by other 
franchisee owners results in efficiency gains (albeit the significance is only at the 10% 
level and only when learning economies to country developer experience is common to 
all countries).  The level of efficiency experienced at country developer owned outlets is 
unaffected by the experience of franchisees within the country.  The fact that single-outlet 
franchisee efficiency is diminished with greater other franchisee experience while multi-
outlet franchisee efficiency may be improved in the presence of other franchisees is a bit 
puzzling.  It may help to balance out the earlier finding of diseconomies to common 
ownership to the extent that common ownership would seem to introduce gains from 
other franchisee experience unavailable to single-outlet franchisees.   
Finally, experience gained at outlets within foreign markets does not seem to 
exert any statistically significant influence on franchisee-owned outlet efficiency.  At the 
same time, country developer owned outlets may suffer efficiency losses as the 
experience in other countries increases.  This may suggest that countries are vying for 
headquarters’ resources and support; as the experience of other countries increases 
(especially where the depreciation factor implies that the experience considered is during 
the past two years) the same headquarters resources are no longer available to support 
country developer outlets.  However, caution is advised here as the significance of this 
finding disappears when we account for country-specific differences in learning 




This study has raised questions concerning the generalizability of the findings 
by Darr, Argote and Epple and others concerning the importance of ownership 
boundaries to the transfer of knowledge.  In one franchised fast-food chain’s foreign 
market operations, I find learning economies to own-outlet experience ranging between 
0.5% and 6%, depending on the country.  These findings are notably lower than earlier 
estimates.  Additionally, I found 96% retention of experience from one week to the 
next versus the 83% found by Darr, Argote and Epple.  Contrary to the prior research, 
experience from commonly-owned franchisee outlets actually is estimated as having 
detrimental effects on efficiency.  With this study I have highlighted the important role 
of country developer experience within the chain studied herein.  Rather than 
experience at commonly-owned outlets or even own-outlet experience, the experience 
that most improves outlet efficiency is experience gained at country developer-owned 
outlets.  This suggests the importance that company/chain policies may have in the 
transfer of knowledge within affiliated operating units.  It serves as a caution against 
the assumption that learning economies from more proximate sources of experience are 
always more influential than those from more distant sources. 
It further cautions against assuming that knowledge always transfers more 
readily within firm boundaries than across them.  The knowledge based view of the 
firm emphasizes the importance of common culture and shared values in facilitating 
knowledge transfer but seems to downplay the role of incentives for knowledge 
transfer.  Contracts can introduce higher-powered incentives than those typically 
present within firm boundaries.  If constructed appropriately, contracts might prove a 
superior alternative to common ownership in inducing agents to transfer knowledge.  
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These findings certainly reiterate the great opportunity for contributions from future 
research into how to exploit different mechanisms of control and governance to 
facilitate the transfer of knowledge and other key firm resources within foreign as well 












































Argentina ARG 1986 JV  $  5,324        30,675 1.64% 364 8  7.9% 276.0% 0.3623 18.0%  $  2,535,001 0   5,580  1986 
Australia AUS 1971 Subsidiary  $10,756        12,660 2.02% 10 1  2.4% 0.0% 0.4819 29.0%  $  6,267,291 6   9,396  1985 
Austria AUT 1977 Subsidiary  $  9,361          7,566 0.33% 100  1  2.6% 16.5% 0.4235 65.2%  $  1,161,967 2   4,699  1984 
Belgium BEL 1978 contract  $10,204          9,822 0.27% 123  32  2.3% 13.9% 0.4325 109.5%  $11,542,942 5   9,682  1987 
Brazil BRA 1979 JV  $  3,886      117,147 2.61% 147  1  4.3% 54.3% 0.0000 14.5%  $13,562,982 0   4,708  1984 
Canada CAN 1967 contract  $  9,093        20,448 2.20% 1  1  2.1% 4.1% 0.4450 39.1%  $59,877,701 7     645  1965 
Chile CHL 1990 Subsidiary  $  4,361        12,901 1.68% 534  20  13.7% 63.6% 0.1353 67.1%  $  3,327,044 0   5,292  1988 
China CHN 1990 JV  $  1,352   1,122,565 1.45% 534  130  5.1% 34.1% 0.0000 24.9%  $21,812,957 0   6,601  1988 
Colombia COL 1995 JV  $  3,628        35,589 2.06% 834  44  4.5% 56.3% 0.4465 35.0%  $  7,438,239 2   2,700  1982 
Costa Rica CRI 1970 contract  $  2,732          1,687 3.46% 6  6  2.8% 5.6% 0.3058 59.5%  $     832,547 7   2,211  1986 
Croatia HRV 1996 Subsidiary  $  4,059          4,455 -0.01% 916  60  3.7% 25.1% 0.4669 93.0%  $     233,600 2   4,789  1990 
Cyprus CYP 1997 JV  $12,239            739 1.29% 1,011  76  36.8% 3.8% 0.4853 99.1%  $     266,453 0   5,949  1989 
Czech Republic CZE 1992 Subsidiary  $  3,531        10,305 0.01% 639  25  12.0% 19.5% 0.5260 108.4%  $     300,197 2   4,551  1989 
Dominican Rep. DOM 1996 contract  $  2,400          7,722 1.93% 916  271  6.3% 45.3% 0.4178 95.8%  $  6,413,879 2   1,922  1985 
Ecuador ECU 1997 JV  $  2,888        11,862 2.46% 1,011  58  1.3% 72.2% 0.1237 53.9%  $  3,125,000 5   2,954  1984 
Egypt EGY 1994 contract  $  1,884        60,677 2.57% 766  12  2.8% 76.4% 0.0000 58.4%  $  3,566,355 0   6,143  1991 
El Salvador SLV 1973 contract  $  1,882          3,791 3.27% 31  20  3.3% 0.0% 0.3726 57.2%  $     448,182 0   1,943  1989 
Estonia EST 1995 Subsidiary  $  3,063          1,499 -0.18% 834  47  12.2% 5.0% 0.5592 167.9%  $       64,271 8   4,469  1991 
Fiji FJI 1996 contract  $  4,185            776 1.05% 916  222  3.3% 9.1% 0.4754 115.1%  $     109,611 0   7,245  1997 
Finland FIN 1984 JV  $11,477          4,856 0.40% 289  87  3.4% 14.2% 0.5414 60.4%  $  1,390,724 0   4,443  1984 
France FRA 1972 contract  $  9,538        51,285 1.05% 20  2  21.3% 5.1% 0.5614 31.8%  $  9,267,505 1   4,142  1980 
Georgia GEO 1999 JV  $     439          5,100 -0.46% 1,232  113  7.3% 280.1% 0.1913 71.7%  $     140,877 5   5,961  2002 
Germany, West DEU 1971 Subsidiary  $  9,425        77,783 0.71% 10  1  0.2% 2.7% 0.3703 40.3%  $23,028,306 5   4,416  1977 
Greece GRC 1991 Subsidiary  $  6,768        10,158 0.52% 584  190  2.6% 31.4% 0.3907 44.9%  $  1,483,500 0   5,448  1987 
Guatemala GTM 1974 contract  $  2,193          5,803 2.97% 44  26  2.2% 0.0% 0.3484 41.1%  $  1,083,996 4   1,886  1985 
Honduras HND 1974 contract  $  1,320          2,964 3.26% 44  26  3.5% 0.0% 0.0000 65.3%  $     867,885 3   1,914  1989 
Hong Kong HKG 1975 JV  $  5,675          4,320 2.11% 61  12  6.0% 6.5% 0.0000 171.1%  $  7,782,317 9   7,801  1987 













































Iceland ISL 1993 contract  $12,618            259 1.02% 700  225  284.6% 26.8% 0.4981 61.2%  $     308,098 1   2,960  1985 
India IND 1996 JV  $  1,490      922,077 1.92% 916  222  3.0% 36.9% 0.5869 25.0%  $  9,021,983 0   7,488  1990 
Indonesia IDN 1991 contract  $  1,974      188,005 1.99% 584  143  3.8% 36.4% 0.0000 49.9%  $  6,109,434 5   9,818  1990 
Ireland IRL 1977 Subsidiary  $  5,836          3,228 1.13% 100  25  2.7% 11.9% 0.4110 96.7%  $  1,287,798 0   3,670  1987 
Israel ISR 1993 contract  $  9,843          4,937 2.49% 700  8  4.3% 53.1% 0.5224 75.0%  $  8,570,998 2   6,198  1986 
Italy ITA 1985 Subsidiary  $10,561        56,697 0.26% 323  100  2.4% 33.9% 0.5017 45.8%  $18,054,305 2   4,822  1980 
Jamaica JAM 1995 Subsidiary  $  2,469  2,547,086  0.82%        834  254  6.7% 80.5% 0.2819 131.7%  $  1,862,993 7   1,765  1984 
Japan JPN 1971 JV  $  7,307  104,345  1.04%          10  1  5.4% 0.0% 0.4891 20.3%  $41,704,714 1   6,311  1983 
Jordan JOR 1996 contract  $  3,194  4,202  4.81%        916  31  10.5% 27.3% 0.0000 127.2%  $     364,093 4   6,217  1991 
Korea KOR 1988 JV  $  5,080  41,622  1.34%        440  106  5.8% 20.6% 0.4227 72.6%  $40,720,602 0   6,549  1987 
Latvia LVA 1994 Subsidiary  $  2,332  2,586  0.05%        766  38  45.7% 143.1% 0.0000 129.5%  $     118,070 8   4,564  1990 
Lebanon LBN 1998 contract  $  2,901  3,430  1.05%     1,125  56  23.3% 43.8% 0.5501 64.3%  $     597,814  6   6,094  1992 
Lithuania LTU 1996 Subsidiary  $  1,735  3,673  0.22%        916  60  1.6% 123.8% 0.4491 117.7%  $       78,455 6   4,703  1993 
Macedonia, 
Yugoslavia MKD 1997 Subsidiary  $  2,270  1,993  0.65%     1,011  76  7.6% 85.5% 0.4649 78.1%  $     135,234 0   5,167  1996 
Malaysia MYS 1982 JV  $  4,011  14,097  2.35%        228  50  183.4% 7.7% 0.1732 110.9%  $  2,868 1   9,274  1992 
Malta MLT 1995 Subsidiary  $  8,073  374 0.62%        834  47  3.4% 13.0% 0.3346 207.1%  $     188 0   5,172  1992 
Mexico MEX 1985 JV  $  5,524  74,945  2.38%        323  134  10.8% 108.1% 0.1725 27.0%  $44,017 0   1,691  1975 
Moldova MDA 1998 Subsidiary  $  2,473  4,442  0.52%     1,125  94  13.0% 1.5% 0.4782 129.1%  $       70 0   5,187  1994 
Morocco MAR 1992 contract  $  2,241  25,244  2.43%        639  6  4.5% 13.2% 0.1398 53.8%  $     623 0   4,290  1989 
Netherlands NLD 1971 JV  $  9,199  13,032  1.27%          10  1  1.7% 0.3% 0.6530 88.7%  $  8,551,222 1   4,117  1983 
New 
Zealand NZL 1976 Subsidiary  $10,526  3,118  1.68%          81  16  6.6% 9.6% 0.3137 54.9%  $  1,857,096 0   8,350  1989 
Nicaragua NIC 1975 contract  $  2,629  2,320  3.18%          61  35  94.1% 0.0% 0.0000 71.8%  $     914,484 2   2,049  1986 
Norway NOR 1983 Subsidiary  $12,177  4,115  0.45%        258  76  83.3% 8.0% 0.4602 78.2%  $  4,457,795 0   4,048  1983 
Pakistan PAK 1998 JV  $  1,472  132,485  2.36%     1,125  264  3.1% 26.8% 0.5027 37.2%  $  2,546,384 0   7,087  1993 
Paraguay PRY 1996 JV  $  2,269  4,878  2.89%        916  50  26.6% 48.2% 0.3780 111.7%  $  1,047,382 0   5,773  1995 
Peru PER 1996 JV  $  2,574  24,556  2.27%        916  50  12.0% 112.8% 0.3430 27.8%  $  2,809,859 5   3,771  1986 
Philippines PHL 1981 JV  $  1,879  50,940  2.81%        199  43  2.1% 5.5% 0.0000 52.0%  $  6,897,949 0   8,144  1993 








































Portugal PRT 1991 Subsidiary  $  7,478  9,923  0.15%        584  190  33.0% 27.0% 0.3852 75.2%  $  2,045,872 0   4,000  1984 
Romania ROM 1995 Subsidiary  $  1,645  22,739  0.13%        834  47  6.2% 184.0% 0.6474 51.9%  $     549,352 0   4,151  1992 
Singapore SGP 1979 JV  $  6,247  2,354  1.58%        147  31  49.7% 12.0% 0.0000 356.5%  $  5,909,163 4   9,377  1992 
Slovakiap SVK 1995 Subsidiary  $  4,475  5,345  0.44%        834  47  10.1% 35.8% 0.4605 124.9%  $     178,327 1   4,789  1989 
Slovenia SVN 1993 Subsidiary  $  8,331  1,892  0.22%        700  31  3.3% 91.4% 0.4032 119.3%  $     150,627 1   4,727  1987 
South 
Africa ZAF 1996 Subsidiary  $  3,098  40,256  1.88%        916  31  3.1% 19.6% 0.4448 50.1%  $  4,958,653 1   8,673  1992 
Spain ESP 1981 JV  $  7,390  37,488  1.02%        199  56  4.6% 10.8% 0.4822 33.5%  $  8,135,150 0   4,192  1982 
Sri Lanka LKA 1998 contract  $  2,734  18,699  1.26%     1,125  264  101.6% 18.8% 0.4049 80.0%  $  1,684,694 1   8,982  1994 
Sweden SWE 1973 contract  $10,963  8,122  0.72%          31  5  2.6% 2.5% 0.4670 46.3%  $  3,909,753 1   4,286  1982 
Switzerland CHE 1976 JV  $12,991  6,404  0.75%          81   19  5.0% 17.9% 0.4358 56.7%  $  5,752,440 3   4,416  1981 
Trinidad 
And 
Tobago TTO 1994 contract  $  7,060  1,175  0.37%        766  245  9.5% 23.2% 0.4694 83.1%  $  1,404,349 2   2,670  1985 
Turkey TUR 1986 Subsidiary  $  3,077  50,669 2.26%        364  1  4.5% 110.1% 0.4024 34.8%  $  2,686,540 0   5,682  1989 
Ukraine UKR 1997 Subsidiary  $     864  50,879 -0.04%     1,011  76  10.2% 187.4% 0.4187 93.9%  $     876,318 0   5,064  1995 
United 
Kingdom GBR 1974 JV  $  9,605  56,210 0.47%          44  9  1.6% 7.2% 0.3459 49.8%  $24,719,296 0   3,960  1979 
Uruguay URY 1991 JV  $  4,602  3,106  0.62%        584            24  12.4% 134.2% 0.3855 46.3%  $     408,430 8   5,648  1988 
Venezuela VEN 1985 JV  $  6,374  6,545  3.03%        323            6  10.6% 18.9% 0.3700 44.0%  $14,549,028 2   2,500  1980 
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Appendix 2: Calculating the Influence of Interaction Terms 
d Likelihood /d ForeignMarket-Years =  βForeignMarket-Years + βExchgeRateRisk X ForeignMarket-Years X 
ExchgeRateRisk + βPoliticRisk X ForeignMarket-Years X PoliticRisk 
   =  -0.229 +  0.006 X 41.19 + 1.59 X 0.302 
  [ExchgeRateRisk & PoliticRisk situated at their mean values] 
   =  -0.229 + 0.247 + 0.480 = 0.498 
However, the range of values over which [d Likelihood /d ForeignMarket-Years]can vary is -0.229 to 
2.490. 
d Likelihood /d RegionMarket-Years   =  βRegionMarket-Years + βEconRisk X RegionMarket-Years X EconRisk 
                =  -0.324 + -0.009 X 18.36      
[EconRisk situated at its mean value] 
               =  -0.324 + -0.165 = -0.489 
However, the range of values over which [d Likelihood /d RegionMarket-Years] can vary is -0.325 to -
2.885. 
d Likelihood /d ExchgeRateRisk    =  βExchgeRateRisk + βExchgeRateRisk X ForeignMarket-Years X ForeignMarket-
Years 
   =  -0.036 + 0.006 X 5.64 
  [ForeignMarket-Years situated at its mean value] 
   =  -0.036 + 0.034 = -0.002 
However, the range of values over which [d Likelihood /d ExchgeRateRisk ] can vary is -0.036 to +0.007. 
d Likelihood /d EconRisk    =  βEconRisk + βEconRisk X RegionMarket-Years X RegionMarket-Years 
   =  0.035 + -0.009 X 3.34                             
  [RegionMarket-Years situated at its mean value] 
   =  0.035 + -0.030 = 0.005 
However, the range of values over which [d Likelihood /d EconRisk ] can vary is -0.015 to +0.035. 
d Likelihood /d PoliticRisk  =  βPoliticRisk + βPoliticRisk X ForeignMarket-Years X ForeignMarket-Years 
 =  -8.442 + 1.590 X 5.64 
  [ForeignMarket-Years situated at its mean] 
 =   -8.442 + 8.968 = -0.526 





Appendix 3: Jurisdictions Analyzed that McDonald’s Entered 
by 1999 










1 United States USA 13,491 287.68 46.90 9,158.96 1955 
2 Japan JPN 3,891 127.07 30.62 364.50 1971 
3 Canada CAN 1,304 31.90 40.87 9,220.97 1967 
4 United Kingdom GBR 1,229 59.91 20.51 240.88 1974 
5 Germany DEU 1,211 82.35 14.71 356.68 1971 
6 France FRA 973 59.93 16.24 550.10 1972 
7 Australia AUS 726 19.55 37.14 7,682.30 1971 
8 Brazil BRA 584 179.91 3.25 8,456.51 1979 
9 China CHN 546 1,279.16 0.43 9,327.42 1990 
10 South Korea KOR 357 47.96 7.44 98.73 1988 
11 Taiwan TWN 350 22.45 15.59 36.00 1984 
12 Spain ESP 333 40.15 8.29 499.44 1981 
13 Italy ITA 329 57.93 5.68 294.11 1985 
14 Mexico MEX 261 103.40 2.52 1,908.69 1985 
15 Sweden SWE 245 8.88 27.60 411.62 1973 
16 Philippines PHL 236 83.00 2.84 298.17 1981 
17 Netherlands NLD 220 16.07 13.69 33.88 1971 
18 Hong Kong HKG 216 7.30 29.58 0.99 1975 
19 Argentina ARG 203 38.33 5.30 2,736.69 1986 
20 Poland POL 200 38.63 5.18 304.42 1992 
21 Austria AUT 157 8.17 19.22 82.73 1977 
22 Malaysia MYS 149 22.66 6.57 328.55 1982 
23 New Zealand NZL 148 3.91 37.87 267.99 1976 
24 Switzerland CHE 138 7.30 18.90 39.55 1976 
25 Singapore SGP 130 4.45 29.20 0.61 1979 
26 Venezuela VEN 129 24.29 5.31 882.05 1985 
27 Puerto Rico PRI 112 3.86 28.99 8.87 1967 
28 Portugal PRT 110 10.08 10.91 91.50 1991 
29 Indonesia IDN 105 231.33 0.45 1,811.57 1991 
30 Thailand THA 100 63.65 1.57 510.89 1985 
31 Israel ISR 99 6.03 16.42 20.62 1993 
32 Russia RUS 94 144.98 0.65 16,888.50 1990 
33 Finland FIN 90 5.18 17.36 304.59 1984 
34 South Africa ZAF 89 42.72 2.08 1,221.04 1996 
35 Denmark DNK 84 5.37 15.65 42.43 1981 
36 Hungary HUN 83 10.08 8.24 92.34 1988 
37 Turkey TUR 81 67.31 1.20 769.63 1986 
38 Saudi Arabia SAU 79 23.51 3.36 2,149.69 1993 
39 Chile CHL 70 15.50 4.52 748.80 1990 
40 Czech Republic CZE 68 10.26 6.63 77.28 1992 
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Appendix 3: Jurisdictions Analyzed that McDonald’s Entered 
by 1999 (cont’d) 












41 Ireland IRL 67 3.88 17.25 68.89 1977 
42 Norway NOR 62 4.53 13.70 306.83 1983 
43 Belgium BEL 56 10.28 5.45 32.82 1978 
44 Greece GRC 54 10.65 5.07 128.90 1991 
45 Ukraine UKR 51 48.40 1.05 579.35 1997 
46 Romania ROM 48 22.32 2.15 230.34 1995 
47 India IND 46 1,034.17 0.04 2,973.19 1996 
48 Egypt EGY 40 73.31 0.55 995.45 1994 
49 Guatemala GTM 38 13.54 2.81 108.43 1974 
50 Kuwait KWT 37 2.11 17.52 17.82 1994 
51 Panama PAN 32 2.92 10.96 74.43 1971 
52 Colombia COL 28 41.01 0.68 1,038.70 1995 
53 United Arab Emirates ARE 28 2.45 11.45 83.60 1994 
54 Costa Rica CRI 24 3.84 6.26 51.06 1970 
55 Uruguay URY 22 3.39 6.50 175.02 1991 
56 Bulgaria BGR 21 7.62 2.76 110.55 1994 
57 Pakistan PAK 20 147.66 0.14 770.88 1998 
58 Morocco MAR 17 31.17 0.55 446.30 1992 
59 Peru PER 17 27.95 0.61 1,280.00 1996 
60 Slovenia SVN 17 1.93 8.79 20.12 1993 
61 Croatia HRV 16 4.39 3.64 55.92 1996 
62 Ecuador ECU 10 13.45 0.74 276.84 1997 
63 Jamaica JAM 10 2.68 3.73 10.83 1995 
64 Dominican Republic DOM 9 8.60 1.05 48.38 1996 
65 Lebanon LBN 9 3.68 2.45 10.23 1998 
66 Malta MLT 8 0.40 20.13 0.32 1995 
67 Estonia EST 7 1.42 4.94 42.27 1995 
68 Honduras HND 7 6.51 1.07 111.89 1974 
69 Jordan JOR 6 5.31 1.13 88.93 1996 
70 Lithuania LTU 6 3.60 1.67 64.80 1996 
71 Latvia LVA 6 2.37 2.54 62.05 1994 
72 Paraguay PRY 6 5.88 1.02 397.30 1996 
73 Belarus BLR 6 10.34 0.58 207.48 1996 
74 El Salvador SLV 5 6.35 0.79 20.72 1973 
75 Oman OMN 5 2.71 1.84 212.46 1994 
76 Nicaragua NIC 4 5.02 0.80 121.40 1975 
77 Macedonia MKD 3 2.06 1.46 25.43 1997 
80 Georgia GEO 2 4.96 0.40 69.70 1999 
81 Sri Lanka LKA 2 19.58 0.10 64.63 1998 
82 Bolivia BOL 0 8.45 0.00 1,084.38 1998 
83 Trinidad & Tobago TTO 0 1.11 0.00 5.13 1994 
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Appendix 4: Jurisdictions Excluded that McDonald’s Entered by 1999  












1 Cyprus CYP 14 0.77 18.25 9.24 1997 
2 Yugoslavia YUG 13 10.66 1.22 255.40 1988 
3 Macau MAC 10 0.46 21.65 0.02 1987 
4 Bahrain BHR 9 0.66 13.71 0.69 1994 
5 Guam GUM 8 0.16 49.75 0.55 1971 
6 Martinique MTQ 7 0.42 16.58 1.10 1991 
7 Qatar QAT 7 0.79 8.82 11.00 1995 
8 Guadeloupe GLP 6 0.44 13.77 1.78 1992 
9 Luxembourg LUX 6 0.45 13.38 2.59 1985 
10 Reunion REU 6 0.74 8.06 2.52 1997 
11 U.S. Virgin Islands VIR 6 0.12 48.58 0.34 1970 
12 Netherland Antilles ANT 5 0.21 23.34 0.80 1974 
13 Bahamas BHS 4 0.30 13.55 10.01 1975 
14 Andorra AND 3 0.07 43.86 0.47 1984 
15 Fiji FJI 3 0.86 3.50 18.27 1996 
16 Iceland ISL 3 0.28 10.74 100.25 1993 
17 Aruba ABW 2 0.07 28.39 0.19 1985 
18 French Polynesia PYF 2 0.26 7.76 3.66 1996 
19 New Caledonia NCL 2 0.21 9.62 18.28 1994 
20 N. Mariana Islands MNP 2 0.08 25.87 0.48 1993 
21 Brunei Darussalam BRN 1 0.35 2.85 5.27 1992 
22 Cuba CUB 1 11.22 0.09 109.82 1986 
23 Gibraltar GIB 1 0.03 36.08 0.01 1999 
24 Liechtenstein LIE 1 0.03 30.45 0.16 1996 
25 Monaco MCO 1 0.03 31.26 0.00 1992 
26 Samoa WSM 1 0.18 5.60 2.83 1996 
27 San Marino SMR 1 0.03 36.06 0.06 1999 
28 Suriname SUR 1 0.43 2.31 156.00 1997 
29 Barbados BRB 0 0.28 0.00 0.43 1989 
30 Bermuda BMU 0 0.06 0.00 0.05 1985 
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Average weekly variable costs per item (constant jan 2000 US dollars).
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Weekly food & labor costs as a proportion of sales.




Appendix 6: Estimations with Different Variable Cost Measures 
Dependent 




















Measure LC Sales 
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then  real 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cum Own SalesA -0.0123 -0.0129 -0.0128 -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0002
  0.0023** 0.0023** 0.0023** 0.0049 0.0037 0.0045 
Cum Own SalesB -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0044 0.0319 0.0224 0.0289
  0.0023 0.0024 0.0022 0.0050** 0.0035** 0.0034** 
Cum Own SalesC -0.0034 -0.0067 -0.0069 0.0015 0.0008 -0.0014
  0.0013** 0.0021** 0.0020** 0.0041 0.0035 0.0054 
Cum Own SalesD -0.0231 -0.0231 -0.0245 -0.0071 -0.0066 -0.0072
  0.0024** 0.0023** 0.0023** 0.0043 0.0035 0.0039 
Cum Own SalesE -0.0324 -0.0362 -0.0403 -0.0345 -0.0323 -0.0336
  0.0019** 0.0023** 0.0025** 0.0030** 0.0029** 0.0045** 
Cum Own SalesF -0.0136 -0.0129 -0.0217 0.0039 0.0021 -0.0050
  0.0066* 0.0064* 0.0064** 0.0073 0.0058 0.0064 
Cum Own SalesG -0.0194 -0.0196 -0.0186 -0.0023 -0.0022 0.0062
  0.0036** 0.0036** 0.0034** 0.0048 0.0041 0.0054 
Cum Own SalesH -0.0057 -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.0446 -0.0296 -0.0120
  0.0012** 0.0013** 0.0012** 0.0038** 0.0023** 0.0029** 
Cum Own SalesI -0.0032 -0.0069 -0.0076 0.0057 0.0048 -0.0086
  0.0014* 0.0014** 0.0016** 0.0043 0.0037 0.0031** 
Cum Own SalesJ -0.0092 -0.0120 -0.0128 -0.0038 -0.0043 -0.0077
  0.0032** 0.0041** 0.0042** 0.0059 0.0039 0.0044 
Observations 597,018 597,018 597,224 597,019 597,019  597,225 
Outlets 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899  1,899 
Log Likelihood 515,074 518,716 511,725 277,450 451,292  319,932 
All regressions include outlet fixed effects, country-specific linear time trends, country-specific controls for scale, assumes 
100% retention of prior week’s experience; residuals are clustered on outlets.  Errors indicated below: * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix 7: Tests of Sample Data Treatment and Composition 



















Dep Variable=efficiency (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cum Own Salescensor  -0.1070    
    0.0184**     
Cum Own Salesclean   -0.0015   
     0.00263    
Cum Own Salestransfer    -0.0004  
      0.0003   
Cum Own Salesclosed     -0.0023
       0.0025 
Cum Own SalesA -0.0129 -0.0185 -0.0128 -0.0129 -0.0126
  0.0023** 0.0027** 0.0023** 0.0023** 0.0023** 
Cum Own SalesB -0.0029 -0.0005 -0.0028 -0.0029 -0.0028
  0.0024 0.0038 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 
Cum Own SalesC -0.0067  -0.0065 -0.0067 -0.0066
  0.0021**  0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0021** 
Cum Own SalesD -0.0231 -0.0236 -0.0231 -0.0231 -0.0230
  0.0023** 0.0032** 0.0023** 0.0023** 0.0023** 
Cum Own SalesE -0.0362 -0.0608 -0.0360 -0.0362 -0.0356
  0.0023** 0.0026** 0.0023** 0.0023** 0.0023** 
Cum Own SalesF -0.0129  -0.0129 -0.0129 -0.0128
  0.0064*  0.0064* 0.0064* 0.0064* 
Cum Own SalesG -0.0196  -0.0195 -0.0196 -0.0185
  0.0036**  0.0036** 0.0036** 0.0037** 
Cum Own SalesH -0.0036  -0.0035 -0.0036 -0.0035
  0.0013**  0.0013** 0.0013** 0.0013** 
Cum Own SalesI -0.0069  -0.0069 -0.0069 -0.0068
  0.0014**  0.0014** 0.0014** 0.0015** 
Cum Own SalesJ -0.0120  -0.0115 -0.0120 -0.0117
  0.0041**  0.0041** 0.0041** 0.0041** 
 Observations  597,018 148,431 597,018 597,018  597,018 
 Stores  1,899 673 1,899 1,899  1,899 
 Log Likelihood  518,716 148,158 518,720 518,718  518,727 
All regressions include outlet fixed effects, country-specific linear time trends, country-specific controls for scale, 
assumes 100% retention of prior week’s experience; residuals are clustered on outlets. Errors indicated below: * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Appendix 8: Estimates of Food and Labor Costs Per Sales Dollar 
 





  (1) (2) (3) 
Cum Own SalesA -0.0129 -0.0141 -0.0087
  0.0023** 0.0045** 0.0022** 
Cum Own SalesB -0.0029 -0.0144 0.0053
  0.0024 0.0035** 0.0020** 
Cum Own SalesC -0.0067 -0.0030 -0.0078
  0.0021** 0.0032 0.0023** 
Cum Own SalesD -0.0231 -0.0249 -0.0181
  0.0023** 0.0037** 0.0022** 
Cum Own SalesE -0.0362 -0.0314 -0.0378
  0.0023** 0.0032** 0.0023** 
Cum Own SalesF -0.0129 0.0095 -0.0177
  0.0064* 0.0143 0.0077* 
Cum Own SalesG -0.0196 -0.0210 -0.0131
  0.0036** 0.0051** 0.0029** 
Cum Own SalesH -0.0036 -0.0008 -0.0020
  0.0013** 0.0035 0.0013 
Cum Own SalesI -0.0069 0.0044 -0.0088
  0.0014** 0.0023 0.0018** 
Cum Own SalesJ -0.0120 -0.0167 -0.0011
  0.0041** 0.0086 0.0039 
 Observations  597,018 604,993  644,449 
 Outlets  1,899 1,899  1,910 
 Log Likelihood  518,716 196,296  412,973 
All regressions include outlet fixed effects, country-specific linear time trends, country-specific controls 
for scale, an assumption of 100% retention of knowledge gained from the prior week’s experience; 
residuals are clustered on outlets; Errors indicated below: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix 9: Variable Cost/Sales Estimates Using 
Weeks vs. Months as Unit of Time 
Dep Variable=Efficiency (1) (2) 
Unit of Time For Panel Weekly Monthly 
Cum Own SalesA -0.0129 -0.0097
  0.0022** 0.0019** 
Cum Own SalesB -0.0029 -0.0033
  0.0024 0.0013* 
Cum Own SalesC -0.0067 -0.0034
  0.0021** 0.0015* 
Cum Own SalesD -0.0231 -0.0182
  0.0023** 0.0016** 
Cum Own SalesE -0.0362 -0.0275
  0.0023** 0.0017** 
Cum Own SalesF -0.0129 -0.0046
  0.0064* 0.0044 
Cum Own SalesG -0.0196 -0.0086
  0.0036** 0.0025** 
Cum Own SalesH -0.0036 -0.0036
  0.0013** 0.0008** 
Cum Own SalesI -0.0069 -0.0049
  0.0014** 0.0010** 
Cum Own SalesJ -0.0120 -0.0081
  0.0041** 0.0028** 
 Observations        597,018        144,033 
 Outlets            1,899             1,909 
 Log Likelihood        518,716        138,781 
Both regressions include outlet fixed effects, country-specific linear time trends, country-specific controls for scale, an 
assumption of 100% retention of knowledge gained from the prior week’s experience; residuals are clustered on 





Appendix 10: Descriptive Statistics For Experience Measures Assuming 100% Knowledge Retention 
Variable Stats Total A B C D E F G H I J 
efficiency # Obs. 601,399 112,319 56,915 50,084 92,578 102,771 13,294 19,120 89,566 46,271 18,481 
variable costs/sales Mean 0.55 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.62 0.48 0.57 0.49 
  St Dev 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.25 
  Min 0.09 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.09 0.20 0.18 0.29 0.10 0.18 0.13 
  Max 31.9 31.9 2.3 3.71 5.5 18.16 3.81 2.12 3.16 1.53 21.36 
Cum Own Sales † # Obs. 675,489 115,038 77,960 54,210 100,232 103,205 16,499 20,868 121,848 46,770 18,859 
In yr 2000 Mean $3.12 $3.01 $1.83 $0.71 $2.96  $8.19 $1.45 $1.32 $2.43 $1.81 $0.42 
US $million St Dev $4.11 $2.24 $1.55 $0.67 $2.69  $7.33 $1.55 $1.33 $2.36 $1.30 $0.45 
  Min $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00  $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
  Max $40.40 $12.75 $9.48 $5.50 $16.74  $40.40 $8.36 $8.60 $16.53 $7.94 $2.46 
Cum Same Franchisee Sales Ŧ # Obs. 377,514 109,807 53,231 43,615 89,108  10,081 20,409 47,975 3,288   
in yr 2000 Mean $11.11 $12.43 $4.43 $0.05 $16.16   $2.79 $13.82 $17.53 $0.57   
US $million St Dev $17.30 $15.90 $7.24 $0.22 $23.00   $3.89 $16.10 $18.70 $0.82   
  Min $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00   $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00   
  Max $113.55 $71.00 $32.25 $2.11 $113.55    $17.82 $53.39 $80.62 $2.96   
Cum Developer Sales Ŧ # Obs. 675,695 115,038 77,960 54,210 100,232 103,205 16,499 20,868 121,848 46,976 18,859 
in yr 2000 Mean $310.75 $16.50 $114.74 $25.11 $66.27  $1,291.84 $22.80 $1.87 $402.38 $166.46 $28.28 
US $million St Dev $478.00 $8.53 $63.50 $14.60 $31.30  $413.00 $9.42 $1.51 $233.00 $91.70 $12.30 
  Min $0.00 $0.00 $17.73 $0.00 $11.23  $417.52 $1.75 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
  Max $1,900.13 $32.91 $227.61 $52.92 $121.78  $1,900.13 $37.55 $4.52 $792.82 $323.07 $47.45 
Cum Other Franchisee Sales Ŧ # Obs. 675,695 115,038 77,960 54,210 100,232  16,499 20,868 121,848 46,976   
in yr 2000 Mean $223 $467 $179 $85 $465   $29 $36 $247 $10   
US $million St Dev $237 $160 $116 $61 $275   $19 $26 $145 $7   
  Min $0 $185 $14 $0 $37   $0 $0 $0 $0   
  Max $1,015 $783 $397 $209 $1,015    $65 $99 $512 $22   
Cum Other Country Sales Ŧ # Obs. 675,695 115,038 77,960 54,210 100,232 103,205 16,499 20,868 121,848 46,976 18,859 
in yr 2000 Mean $3,199 $2,634 $3,671 $4,289 $3,167  $2,022 $4,117 $3,488 $3,367 $3,647 $4,841 
US $million St Dev $1,530 $1,540 $1,450 $1,330 $1,400  $1,190 $1,460 $1,550 $1,220 $1,350 $1,020 
  Min $391 $603 $769 $827 $738  $391 $823 $824 $823 $825 $2,056 
  Max $6,562 $5,796 $5,989 $6,352 $5,481  $4,714 $6,507 $6,507 $5,312 $6,299 $6,562 





Appendix 11: Descriptive Statistics for Experience Measures Assuming 96% Knowledge Retention 
Variable Stats Total A B C D E F G H I J 
efficiency # Obs. 601,399 112,319 56,915 50,084 92,578 102,771 13,294 19,120 89,566 46,271 18,481 
variable costs/sales Mean 0.55 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.49 0.54 0.5 0.62 0.48 0.57 0.49 
  St Dev 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.25 
  Min 0.09 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.09 0.2 0.18 0.29 0.1 0.18 0.13 
  Max 31.9 31.9 2.3 3.71 5.5 18.16 3.81 2.12 3.16 1.53 21.36 
*Cum Own Sales # Obs. 675,592 115,038 77,960 54,210 100,232 103,205 16,499 20,868 121,848 46,873 18,859 
In yr 2000 Mean $220.82 $145.05 $179.78 $106.25 $246.48 $401.23 $146.89 $169.96 $253.60 $181.30 $65.87 
US $1000s St Dev $140.58 $61.20 $84.64 $62.50 $123.17 $168.95 $66.88 $70.60 $115.00 $53.60 $39.86 
  Min $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
  Max $1,255.96 $519.78 $502.41 $531.55 $806.86 $1,255.96 $318.10 $444.69 $862.82 $380.39 $198.99 
*Cum Same Franchisee Sales # Obs. 377,522 109,807 53,231 43,615 89,108  10,081 20,409 47,975 3,296   
in yr 2000 Mean $812.67 $630.18 $420.53 $7.18 $1,030.49  $286.56 $1,726.96 $1,766.09 $66.07   
US $1000s St Dev $1,185.15 $866.48 $539.46 $29.65 $1,096.09  $332.12 $1,850.64 $1,735.75 $82.03   
  Min $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00  $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00   
  Max $7,175.86 $4,024.27 $2,461.66 $286.24 $5,737.31   $1,193.99 $5,314.12 $7,175.86 $229.05   
*Cum Developer Sales # Obs. 672,689 115,038 77,960 54,020 100,232 103,205 16,499 18,147 121,848 46,881 18,859 
in yr 2000 Mean $197.51 $10.07 $101.28 $30.52 $45.76 $603.63 $15.93 $2.26 $384.62 $156.59 $40.78 
US $100K St Dev $236.00 $3.64 $50.67 $14.98 $22.42 $118.00 $4.26 $0.64 $182.00 $45.66 $11.95 
  Min $0.00 $0.00 $9.28 $0.00 $7.23 $308.20 $2.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
  Max $803.14 $18.02 $177.71 $62.57 $79.19 $803.14 $19.31 $2.95 $570.50 $206.10 $53.31 
*Cum Other Franchisee Sales # Obs. 550,379 115,038 77,960 54,210 100,232  15,922 20,868 121,818 44,331   
in yr 2000 Mean $216 $219 $195 $129 $398  $34 $46 $243 $12   
US $100K St Dev $166 $52 $105 $85 $229  $13 $28 $113 $4   
  Min $0 $122 $8 $0 $33  $0 $0 $0 $0   
  Max $838 $310 $365 $282 $838   $51 $113 $385 $15   
*Cum Other Country Sales # Obs. 675,695 115,038 77,960 54,210 100,232 103,205 16,499 20,868 121,848 46,976 18,859 
in yr 2000 Mean $221 $196 $243 $283 $211 $173 $281 $241 $212 $250 $324 
US $million St Dev $91 $101 $81 $70 $79 $94 $84 $92 $67 $81 $51 
  Min $29 $47 $59 $63 $55 $29 $62 $63 $62 $63 $150 

























Country B 9.04**   
  0.0027          
Country C 3.98* 1.41   
  0.0461 0.2349         
Country D 9.76** 36.53** 27.5**   
  0.0018 0 0        
Country E 51.93** 101.64** 91.24** 16.06**   
  0 0 0 0.0001       
Country F 0 2.15 0.86 2.26 11.84**  
  0.9963 0.1428 0.354 0.1331 0.0006      
Country G 2.51 14.94** 9.67** 0.65 15.05** 0.85  
  0.1136 0.0001 0.0019 0.4203 0.0001 0.3578     
Country H 12.41** 0.07 1.57 53.54** 155.32** 2.04 17.52**  
  0.0004 0.7949 0.2102 0 0 0.1538 0    
Country I 4.83* 2.04 0.01 34.67** 1117.33** 0.84 10.73** 2.89†  
  0.0281 0.1538 0.931 0 0 0.3591 0.0011 0.0894   
Country J 0.03 3.66† 1.35 5.4* 26.07** 0.01 1.9 3.79† 1.38
  0.864 0.056 0.2463 0.0203 0 0.9118 0.1677 0.0517 0.2401
For each country pair (box above), the top number is the result of F(1,1898) while the bottom number is the probability that the two estimated 
coefficients are equivalent.  If there is greater than a 10% chance that the two learning economies between any country pair are equivalent, I have 
shaded the box.  These country pairs represent instances where I cannot rule out the possibility that a single estimate related to the two countries 
could be used.  However, I have retained the ten individual coefficients in subsequent estimates as this allows for greater flexibility when I introduce 
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